CONFIDENTIAL

5800
Ser 13/ 01002H
21 NOV 1969

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Rear Admiral J USN, investigative report of 18 July 1969

From: Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Judge Advocate General

Subj: Joint USN/RAN Investigation - collision of USS FRANK E. EVANS and HMAS MELBOURNE on 3 June 1969 (U)

Ref: (f) CINCPACFLT's ltr FF1-1 5800 ser 13/8307H of 3 November 1969

1. (U) Forwarded.

2. (C) The record of this investigation is explicit on two pertinent points; one, that the tactical documents utilized by the combined task group were adequate and thus not contributory to the collision; and two, that the command and control organization was well known to all participating units prior to the commencement of the exercise. Consequently, the tragic event that transpired can be ascribed to error in individual human judgment rather than to faulty planning or to errors in the command and control organization devised for the multi-national force. Accordingly, prejudice by or towards SEATO is neither justified nor anticipated.

3. (U) Rear Admiral Jr., USN is to be complimented for the outstanding investigation conducted under his direction. It is thorough and complete in all respects. This is particularly significant in view of the delicate and complicated nature of the proceedings which were conducted in full view of the world press.

4. (U) The Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet specifically makes no comment with respect to the culpability of CDR in connection with this tragic incident. At the present time a review of the court-martial held in CDR case is being conducted by Commander Cruiser Destroyer Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and any comment bearing on the subject of culpability would be most inappropriate.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

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6. (U) Subject to the foregoing comments the findings of fact and opinions of the investigation as acted upon by the Commander SEVENTH Fleet, are approved.

Copy to:
CNO
COMTRAPAC
COMNAVSAFCEN
COMCRUDESPAC
COMCRUDESGRUSEVENTHFLT
COMASWGRU ONE

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5800
Ser 013- 0185
14 OCT 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Unclassified upon removal of basic correspondence)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Rear Admiral . U.S. Navy investigative report of 18 July 1969

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet
To: Judge Advocate General
Via: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Joint USN/RAN Investigation - collision of USS FRANK E. EVANS and HMAS MELBOURNE on 3 June 1969

1. Forwarded.

2. Soon after the collision of USS FRANK E. EVANS and HMAS MELBOURNE procedures for an investigation into the circumstances were discussed by message with the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board. It was agreed that the investigation would be more complete and the circumstances more fully presented if a joint USN/RAN board of investigation was convened before which all the witnesses could testify. Out of these considerations, and after authorization from the Secretary of the Navy was granted, Commander SEVENTH Fleet issued an appointing order for the joint investigation. The proceedings were conducted generally as an informal investigation under the JAG Manual with U. S. Navy witnesses being accorded their rights under Article 31, UCMJ and the rights of Royal Australian Navy witnesses being protected under procedures applicable in an Australian investigation. The investigation was thorough, complete and effectively examined all the available evidence concerning the circumstances of the collision. The investigation was conducted expeditiously and the proceedings reflect careful consideration of the scope of the investigation and the rights of witnesses.

3. On 4 August COMSEVENTHFLT ordered a pretrial investigation into sworn charges against the conning officer, LTJG . USN, the officer of the deck, LTJG USN, and the Commanding Officer, Commander . , USN. On 3 September, COMSEVENTHFLT

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UCMJ. An appeal of that punishment has been forwarded to Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet. On 11 September, LTJG entered a plea of guilty to charges of dereliction in the performance of duty and negligently hazarding a vessel before a general court-martial convened by Commander SEVENTH Fleet at U. S. Naval Base, Subic Bay and was sentenced to be reprimanded and to lose 1000 numbers of the unrestricted line. The record of trial has been reviewed and forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for examination. Commander MCLEMORE, after entering

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pleas of not guilty, was found guilty on 16 September of dereliction in the performance of duty and of negligently hazarding a vessel by a general court-martial convened by Commander SEVENTH Fleet at U. S. Naval Base, Subic Bay and sentenced to be reprimanded. The record of trial is being authenticated and will be submitted to Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet for initial review.

4. It is noted that Captain RAN, Commanding Officer of HMAS MELBOURNE, was tried by an Australian military court on charges he was negligent in failing to positively direct the movements of EVANS when she came into a collision course and for failure to take more positive action to avoid the collision. He was "acquitted with honor" on 25 August 1969.

5. The facts shows that no collision alarm or any other alarm was sounded in EVANS prior to the collision. As a consequence, only those personnel on watch topside were aware a collision was imminent and all other suffered the collision without any prior warning. The testimony of the survivors describe the disorientation and confusion of personnel awakened while the ship was being rolled 90 degrees by MELBOURNE. Although it is speculative to state that more of the crew would have survived the collision if the collision alarm had been sounded at some time prior to the collision, it is fair to say one of the reasons for sounding the alarm is to alert all ship personnel to a situation in which a collision is likely. It appears neither the conning officer nor the officer of the deck considered sounding the collision alarm.

6. Opinion 7 is a valid comment on the sufficiency of an operation order and deserves consideration by those commands that participate in the preparation of an operation order which includes a zigzag plan.

7. Except as otherwise noted, the proceedings, findings of fact and opinions are approved.

Copy to:
COMTRAPAC (w/basic)
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ORIGINAL

REPORT

OF THE COMBINED USN R.A.N. BOARD OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE COLLISION BETWEEN HMAS MELBOURNE AND USS FRANK E. EVANS CONVENED BY COMSEVENTHFLT AND ACNB

Original & 2 Encls

Ybn d# 804-69

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The Record of Proceedings is contained in two volumes separate from this document.

ORIGINAL

From: Rear Admiral Jr., U. S. Navy
To: Commander Seventh Fleet
Australian Commonwealth Naval Board

Subj: Board of investigation to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the collision of HMAS MELBOURNE and USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754) on 3 June 1969 (U)

Ref: (a) COMSEVENTHFLT 050604Z Jun 1969 (U)
(b) ACNB Convening Order dtd 7 Jun 1969 (U)
(c) COMSEVENTHFLT 050300Z Jul 1969 (U)
(d) ACNB 061431Z Jul 1969 ~~(C)~~ U
(e) COMSEVENTHFLT 160230Z Jun 1969 ~~(C)~~ U

Encl: (1) Subject record of proceedings ~~(C)~~ U
(2) Selection of photographs connected with the collision
(3) Report of examination of witnesses' statements by other witnesses
(4) Listing of errors in Exhibit 27
(5) Glossary of terms - RAN/USN

Preliminary Statement

1. (U) Pursuant to the authority contained in references (a) through (d) a combined Royal Australian Navy - United States Navy Board of Investigation inquired into the circumstances surrounding the collision of HMAS MELBOURNE and USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754), which occurred in the South China Sea on 3 June 1969. As required by the references (a) and (b), a verbatim transcript of the record of proceedings was prepared. It is forwarded herewith as enclosure (1). Its overall classification is CONFIDENTIAL. Pages thereof are individually marked as to their classification.

2. (U) Despite the unique character of the Board, the agreement between the two Navies that the procedures of the U. S. Navy Manual of the Judge Advocate General should apply, provided a common procedural framework for the Board's action, which minimized any procedural problems which might have been expected. The somewhat differing rights of witnesses of the two Navies before a board of this nature created minor differences in the treatment of individual witnesses which are reflected in the advice given to each witness at the outset of his testimony. These differences are apparent in the verbatim record. Additionally, the according of one U.S. Navy witness of his rights under section 0606d(2) of the JAG Manual resulted in that witness's refusal to testify and the eventual modification of the Board's original terms of reference to permit it to receive unsworn statements.

3. (U) The Board conducted hearings in open and closed session on twenty days. In addition, it conducted viewings of HMAS MELBOURNE, the stern section of USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754) and the bow section of a sister ship of USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754). The selection of photographs attached as enclosure (2), although not admitted into evidence, was examined by the Board, and assisted the Board, in the same manner as the ship viewings, in weighing and interpreting the evidence.

4. ~~(C)~~ U In the course of its proceedings, the Board directed the preparation of an analysis of signals on the MELBOURNE Task Group Primary Tactical Radiotelephone circuit from

approximately noon on 2 June 1969 until the time of collision. This analysis was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 27. The Board's analysis of Exhibit 27 disclosed certain errors of substance and procedure, which are outlined in enclosure (4). This listing may not be complete as the Board itself made no detailed comparison of Exhibit 27 with every log used by the witness who prepared Exhibit 27. Enclosure (4) is included in order that reviewing authorities may be aware that there may be errors in Exhibit 27.

5. (U) Although not indicated fully in the record at all stages, copies of exhibits have been substituted for the originals in all copies of the record. Where the originals are part of the legally required records of RAN or USN commands (e.g. PRITAC logs, navigational data book), they have been returned to their legal custodians for retention. The originals of other exhibits will be retained by Commander ASW Group ONE for use by either Navy in the event of subsequent proceedings.

6. (U) Enclosure (5) is a glossary of RAN and USN terms used by the Board and witnesses which do not have a common meaning in the two Navies.

7. (U) In the course of its hearings, the Board received evidence indicating meritorious performance by a number of naval personnel, Australian and American. The Board understands that national authorities are taking action to insure that such achievements are recognized and rewarded. In view of the Board's limited investigation of this aspect, its references to such persons and achievements are necessarily incomplete.

8. (U) The Board, after inquiring into all the facts and circumstances surrounding the collision, and having considered the evidence, finds as follows and submits the following opinions:

(Findings of fact begin on page 3)

INDEX TO FINDINGS OF FACTS AND OPINIONS

FINDINGS OF FACT

EVENTS PRIOR TO COLLISION

Command and Control, and Tactical Documents

1. (U) On the early morning of 3 June 1969, USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754) and HMAS MELBOURNE were taking part in SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit in the South China Sea (R,p. 3).

2. (U) On 2-3 June HMAS MELBOURNE was commanded by Captain , RAN (R,p. 76).

3. (U) On 2-3 Jume USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754) was commanded by Commander USN (R,p. 43).

4. (U) USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754) (hereafter EVANS) and HMAS MELBOURNE (hereafter MELBOURNE) were part of Exercise Task Group 472.1 and Task Unit 472.1.0, which comprised an identical group of ships (hereafter referred to as "MELBOURNE Task Group") (Exhibit 1).

5. (U) Other ships in Task Group 472.1 and Task Unit 472.1.0 were USS JAMES E. KYES (DD-787), USS EVERETT F. LARSON (DD-830), HMNZS BLACKPOOL, and HMS CLEOPATRA (Exhibit 1).

6. (U) Exercise command of the Task Group was vested in Rear Admiral G.J.B. CRABB, C.B.E., D.S.C., Flag Officer Commanding, H.M. Australian Fleet (FOCAF), embarked in MELBOURNE as CTF 472 and CTG 472.1 (R,p. 3; Exhibit 1).

7. (U) The testimony of RADM Crabb CTF 472 and CTG 472.1) and of Capt Stevenson (CTU 472.1.0 and CO MELBOURNE) indicates their understanding that the latter did not assume tactical command of TG 472.1 until about 021530Z (R,p. 24, 82).

8. (U) In his capacity as CTU 472.1.0, CO MELBOURNE was directed by a Tactical Primary signalled order of CTG 472.1 at about 020715Z, to assume tactical command of TG 472.1 (Exhibit 27, p. 1).

9. (U) According to Tactical Primary logs from 020715Z to collision at about 022015Z, tactical command of TG 472.1 was exercised by CTU 472.1.0 without interruption except for the period 021402Z-021449Z when CTG 472.1 issued direct to the Screen Commander (CTU 472.1.2) four signalled orders concerning a Surface Attack Group Exercise then in progress. No evidence pertaining to visual or TG Common signalling was sought by the board (Exhibit 27, p. 1-8).

10. (U) During the period from midnight 2-3 June to the time of the collision, tactical command of Task Group 472.1 and Task Unit 472.1.0 was being exercised by the Commanding Officer, HMAS MELBOURNE (hereafter CO MELBOURNE) in his capacity as CTU 472.1.0 (R,p. 8; R,p. 82).

11. (U) Screen Commander was CTU 472.1.2 (Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-THREE) in USS JAMES E. KYES (Exhibit 1).

12. (U) The effective operation order for the MELBOURNE Task Group was CTF 472 (FOCAF) OpOrder 1/69 (Exhibit 1).

13. (U) Tactical doctrine applicable to the maneuvers and evolutions involved during the period relevant to this investigation was laid down in the OpOrder itself, in the pamphlet Maritime Operating Procedures (MOP) prepared for the exercise (Exhibit 2) and in ATP 1(A), Vols. 1 and 2 (through change 4). A complete listing of publications made effective for Exercise Sea Spirit is contained in Annex G of the OpOrder (Exhibit 1).

14. (U) In addition to the tactical publications listed in finding of fact number 13, CO HMAS MELBOURNE had, in accordance with CTF 472 OpOrder 1/69, prepared and distributed to the escorts a pamphlet entitled "HMAS MELBOURNE Escort Handout" (Exhibit 17) which described additional procedures for MELBOURNE escorts (R,p. 79; Exhibit 1).

15. (U) FOCAF OPORDER 1/69 contained zigzag plans considered appropriate for the operation because he was uncertain whether every participant in the exercise would have ATP-3 (R,p. 36; Exhibit 1).

16. (U) Zigzag plans in FOCAF OPORDER 1/69 were extracted from ATP-3 but were not identified as to their source (Exhibit 1).

17. (U) FOCAF OPORDER 1/69 did not contain zigzag doctrine (Exhibit 1).

18. (U) CO MELBOURNE, CO EVANS and those watch officers of MELBOURNE, EVANS, and BLACKPOOL who testified understood that ATP-3 series was the basic reference for zigzag doctrine (R,p. 96, 208, 223, 277, 315, 323).

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19. (C) ATP-3(A) had superseded ATP-3 several months previously in USN ships but had not yet been distributed to RAN ships (R,p. 208, 323, 541).

20. (C) ATP-3 and ATP-3(A) vary widely both as to specific zigzag plans and to some extent as to important aspects of execution (Examination of documents).

21. (C) Neither ATP-3 nor ATP-3(A) was authorized for use during this exercise (Exhibit 1).

22. (C) No tactical publication effective for Exercise Sea Spirit contained a definition of the term "patrol" in the sense of patrolling an ASW sector screen (Review of documents).

23. (U) CO standing night orders (USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754) Instruction 3121.1A), which were a part of the night orders for 2-3 June 1969, included, inter alia, the following provisions as to calling the Commanding Officer:

"3. . . .
" . ***
t. Call me and the Navigator under the following circumstances:
"(1) When in doubt as to the safe position or the course of the ship.
"(2) If you change course or speed for any reason.
* * *
"u. Call me under the following additional circumstances:
"(1) . . .
"(2) When any changes are made to the formation of which FRANK E. EVANS is a part.
* * *
"(7) Should the question of whether to call me or inform me of something ever enters your thoughts" (Exhibit 13).

24. (U) Paragraph 3t(2) of the standing night order had been modified by CO to delete the requirements that the Commanding Officer and Navigator be called for course and speed changes made solely for the purpose of patrolling a screen assignment (R,p. 49, 56).

25. (U) CO standing night orders had been under revision since 1 February 1969, and the revised draft (Exhibit 13) included the amendment referred to in finding of fact number 24 (Exhibit 13).

26. (U) Except for the change described in finding of fact number 25, the typewritten orders had not been modified, verbally or otherwise, and the other handwritten changes on Exhibit 13 had not been put into effect (R,p. 49).

27. (U) a. All officers of EVANS standing Bridge or CIC Watches had been required to sign the Captain's Standing Night Orders by way of acknowledgement that they had been read and understood.

b. The requirements of the CO EVANS in practice accorded with the wording of the Standing Night Orders (R,p. 201, 317, 322).

c. There is some evidence that LTJG Ramsey did not believe the Captain required that he be called invariably when the ship was ordered to change station (Exhibit 101).

d. The basis for such belief could not be investigated or established.

Status of Ships

28. (C) From 022236G ships in the MELBOURNE Task Group were in the following formation:

Main body and guide - MELBOURNE
ASW Screen (Symmetrical about a bearing of 220°) - CLEOPATRA, BLACKPOOL and EVANS in adjacent 40 degree sectors from 160° to 280° between 3000 and 5000 yards from MELBOURNE.
and n adjacent 30° sectors from 190°-250°, between 7000 and 10,000 yards from MELBOURNE (R,p. 133; Exhibit 26).

29. (C) EVANS was assigned a sector with outer bearings 240°(t) to 280°(t), range 3000 to 5000 yards, from MELBOURNE (R,p. 133; Exhibits 26, 28).

30. (U) EVANS was the right flank escort of the inner sector screen (R,p. 61, 114, 133; Exhibits 26, 28).

31. (C) When a sector screen was ordered, the Maritime Operating Procedures required screen ships to "patrol widely throughout their sectors" (Exhibit 2, p. D-4).

32. (U) Instructions to escorts prohibited them from approaching closer than 500 yards to the boundary of an adjacent occupied sector (Exhibit 2, p. D-4).

33. (U) From shortly after 2300G, 2 June, MELBOURNE Task Group had been on base course 220°(t) when zigzagging, speed 18 knots (R,p. 83; Exhibit 27).

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34. (U) On 2 June 1969 and 3 June 1969 until the time of collision, EVANS was in general condition of readiness III, engineering condition of readiness II, with both main generators on the line, and engineering plant in split plant operation, including the electrical load (R,p. 48, 51, 115).

35. (U) After darkness on 2 June 1969 and until the time of collision EVANS at sea routine required Material Condition "Yoke" with "darken ship". Yoke and Xray fittings opened for any reason during this condition were to be noted in a closure log maintained on the Bridge (R,p. 48, 222).

36. (U) At the time of the collision, at least two main deck "Yoke" fittings (hatch 1 - 136) and a door in the after deckhouse, starboard side (1 - 135 - 1) were open. It is not known whether these were recorded in the closure log (R,p. 447, 557).

37. (U) At about 2100G, 2 June, CO EVANS had promulgated his night orders for the night of 2-3 June (R,p. 48).

38. (U) CO EVANS night orders for the night of 2-3 June were lost as a result of the collision (R,p. 49).

39. (U) CO EVANS retired to his sea cabin for the night sometime after midnight (R,p. 52).

40. (U) CO EVANS' sea cabin was located between the pilot house and CIC (R,p. 57-58, Exhibit 14).

41. (U) MELBOURNE's program for flying operations during the period from 0600H, 2 June, to 0800G, 3 June, had been promulgated to the task group by signals (Exhibit 19).

42. (U) The program provided for the recovery of a fixed wing (S2E) aircraft at 0330G on 3 June (Exhibit 19).

43. (U) CO EVANS night orders gave no special instructions that he should be called in connection with MELBOURNE's scheduled flying operation which he recalled was scheduled for the time frame of 0300G to 0330G (R,p. 52).

44. (U) When so informed, it was his practice to make a decision whether to be on the bridge or not in the light of all relevant considerations including the difficulty of the maneuver, time of day, whether the ships were darkened or not and to some extent which officer had the deck watch (R,p. 587-8).

45. (U) It was not the invariable practice of CO EVANS to be on the bridge when informed that his ship was changing station at night (R,p. 63; 587-8).

46. (U) CO EVANS' night orders for 2-3 June enjoined watch officers to review the rules for zigzagging but did not refer to any specific publication as being applicable under the circumstances (R,p. 201, p. 541).

47. (U) At about 0300G, 3 June the weather in the vicinity of the MELBOURNE Task Group was as follows:

Sea - glassy calm
Wind - practically none
Visibility - unrestricted
Clouds - scattered
Light - bright moonlight except where cloud cover created shadows (moon azimuth about 170°(t), altitude 22°) (R,p. 84, 121, 155).

48. (U) Commencing at 1505G, 2 June, the MELBOURNE Task Group had been zigzagging using both plan 13S and 17S at various times. The zigzag was from time to time discontinued and later resumed (Exhibit 27).

49. (U) At 2308G, 2 June, MELBOURNE was ordered by signal from CTU 472.1.0 to zigzag according to Plan 13S, base course 220°. The MELBOURNE Task Group was an information addressee (Exhibit 27).

50. (U) Zigzag plan 13S is a three hour, short leg plan, taken from Annex D, CTF 472 (FOCAF) OPORD 1/69 (Exhibit 1).

51. (U) Zigzagging was discontinued during the period 0206G to 0215G 3 June. It was again discontinued at 0246G and resumed at 0255G 3 June (Exhibit 27).

52. (U) The "Execute to follow" signal for MELBOURNE to resume previous zigzag had been sent by CTU 472.1.0 (CO MELBOURNE) on the Primary Tactical Circuit (Voice) info TU 472.1.2 (Screen) at 0253G (Exhibit 27).

53. (U) The signal in finding of fact number ~~51~~ 53 was executed with similar addressal at 0255G (Exhibit 27).

54. (U) Both the "Excute to follow" and "execute" signals were receipted for only by MELBOURNE, no other station being required to receipt (Exhibit 27).

55. (U) Assignment to duty as rescue destroyer in the MELBOURNE Task Group was normally promulgated for a 24 hours period by the Task Group Commander by means of a message entitled OPGEN Alfa (R, p. 24).

56. (U) The OPGEN Alfa message covering the period from completion of replenishment, 2 June, until 0800H, 3 June, designated BLACKPOOL as rescue destroyer (Exhibit 15).

57.a.(U) At 1808G, 2 June, CTU 472.1.0 asked the Screen Commander on PRITAC to detail a unit for rescue destroyer duties (Exhibit 27).

b.(U) At 1808G, 2 June, the Screen Commander, on PRITAC, designated EVANS to assume duty as rescue destroyer. No duration for such duty was stated. PRITAC logs do not indicate that this signal was receipted by EVANS (Exhibit 27).

c.(U) At 1813G, the Screen Commander and EVANS exchanged messages on the subject of EVANS assuming duty as rescue destroyer (Exhibit 27).

d.(U) Although PRITAC logs do not clearly indicate that EVANS understood the messages 1808G and 1813G regarding assignment as rescue destroyer, both the OOD and CIC Watch Officer of EVANS for the 1800-2000 watch on 2 June recall receiving a message designating FRANK E. EVANS as rescue destroyer (R, p. 312,321).

e.(U) The 1800-2000 OOD of EVANS informed CO EVANS, of the receipt of the message designating EVANS as rescue destroyer (R, p. 312).

f.(U) CO EVANS mentioned to the 2000-2400, 2 June, OOD that EVANS was rescue destroyer again (R, p. 201).

58. (U) During the period from the receipt of the signal designating EVANS as rescue destroyer at 1808G, 2 June, and the "form column" signal at about 0309G, 3 June, EVANS had been directed by PRITAC to leave and return to her screen station and to take rescue destroyer station as follows:

SIGNAL TO FORM COLUMN FROM SCREEN	SIGNAL TO TAKE RESDES STATION	SIGNAL TO FORM COLUMN	SIGNAL TO RETURN TO SCREEN
1816G	1831G 1842G	1837G	1846G
1953G	1957G		2003G
2048G	2056G	2107G 2209G* 2213G* 2221G*	
	2258G		2301G

(NOTE: * Movements out of column unknown as signals not reflected in PRITAC logs (Exhibit 27).

59. (U) During the same period no other ship performed duties as rescue destroyer in the MELBOURNE Task Group (Exhibit 27).

60. (U) CO MELBOURNE was on the bridge from about 0307G until after the collision (R, p. 85, 168).

61. (U) Bridge Watch Officers of MELBOURNE at this time were LT RAN, Officer of the Watch, and Acting Sub-Lieutenant AN, Second Officer of the Watch (R, p. 84, 166).

62. (U) EVANS bridge watch officers were LTJG , USN, Officer of the Deck, and LTJG , IV, USN, Junior Officer of the Deck, the latter having the conn (R, p. 114, 116, 117).

63. (U) LTJG had been standing watch as an underway officer of the deck (Fleet Operations) for about four months, and his formal designation as OOD (Fleet Operations) had been signed about ten days prior to the collision (R, p. 53, 56).

64. (U) LTJG had been aboard EVANS approximately 19 months during which period he had stood JOOD and CIC watches underway. He was not a qualified underway OOD (R, p. 111, 112).

65. (U) At 0307G MELBOURNE changed course to 260°(T) in accordance with zigzag Plan 13S (R, p. 85; Exhibit 1; Annex D).

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66. (U) The next scheduled zigzag turn was at 0313G to course 240°(T) (Exhibit 1; Annex D).

Lights

67. (U) The MELBOURNE Task Group was steaming darkened ship except as required for flight operations (R, p. 84).

68. (U) MELBOURNE, while conducting night helicopter operations had displayed lighting in accordance with doctrine contained in Maritime Operating Procedure (PX 39) in effect for SEA SPIRIT as did other ships in TU 472.1.0 (Exhibit 17, 27).

69. (U) MELBOURNE had conducted fixed wing flying operations during the period 1800-2300G on 2 June and conformed to lighting measures prescribed for the exercise and as stated in the Escort Handout (Exhibit 17, 27).

70. (U) The three groups of moonlights on the mast illuminate the forward, center and aft sections of the flight deck and any one or all of the three groups can be turned on (R, p. 168, 288).

71. (U) When moonlighting is turned on to illuminate the flight deck forward the OOW on the bridge would be aware of it (R, p. 169).

72. (U) The sources of "moonlighting" are not themselves visible from other ships, but the light they shed, and the objects they illuminate are visible from some distance away (R, p. 189, 288, 467; Exhibit 17).

73. (U) MELBOURNE's red masthead or obstruction lights were turned off after the 0304G helicopter launch and were off at the time of collision as were the Flying Lights on the mast and three red verticle droplights on the stern (Exhibit 17, 27).

74. (U) The center group of MELBOURNE's flight deck "moonlighting" and possibly the after group were on at the time of collision and for a period of four or five minutes before (R, p. 284).

75. (U) Although the OOW in MELBOURNE is normally informed when moonlighting is turned on, the middle watch OOW, LT Lamb, was not aware that the center group had been turned on (R, p. 176).

"Form Column" Signal to Collision

76. (U) At approximately 0310G, CTU 472.1.0 sent a signal over PRITAC action to TU 472.1.0 directing MELBOURNE and EVANS to form column in sequence MELBOURNE, EVANS at standard distance (Exhibit 27).

77. (U) The signal to "Form Column" was sent by the delayed executive method, the "Execute to Follow" signal having been sent about 0309G and the "Execute" at about 0310G (Exhibit 27).

78. (U) The signal to form column at standard distance was the signal used uniformly by MELBOURNE to position an escort astern prior to its taking rescue destroyer (plane guard) station (R, p. 85, 313; Exhibit 27).

79. (U) These signals required EVANS to station herself 1000 yards astern of MELBOURNE.

80. (U) Both the "Execute to Follow" signal and the "Execute" signal were received, understood and receipted for by the OOD of EVANS (R, p. 117, 118).

81. (U) At the time EVANS commenced her maneuver MELBOURNE was on course of 260°, 18 knots, and remained so until shortly before collision (R, p. 85, 86, 87, 167, 169).

82. (U) EVANS' exact position relative to MELBOURNE is not determinable from the conflicting evidence presented to the board. The best estimation that the board has been able to make is that EVANS was at a range of about 3700 yards within an arc of bearing from MELBOURNE 230°-240° (R, p. 117).

83. (U) EVANS' exact heading at the time she commenced her maneuver is not determinable from the evidence presented to the board. The ship had been patrolling station and was swinging right under 3°-5° of right rudder. The best estimation of her heading that the board has been able to make is some degrees higher than 220° and probably not more than 260° (R, p. 85, 125, 168).

84. (U) EVANS' ship's speed during the "Form Column" maneuver as from 0311G was 22 knots. LTJG knew this but LTJG believed it to be 20 knots (R, p. 117; Exhibits 69 and 101).

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85. (U) LTJG . believed the base course and speed of the formation to be 185 , 16 knots, and that MELBOURNE would continue the zigzag (R, p. 117, 119, exhibit 30).

86. (U) LTJG believed that during the "Form Column" maneuver, MELBOURNE's course would be 205° (R, p. 117).

87. (U) LTJG knew that MELBOURNE's course and speed in accordance with the zigzag plan was 260°, 18 knots, at the time of execute "Form Column" (Exhibit 100).

88. (U) Whatever exchange may have taken place between LTJG nd LTJG in connection with the maneuver, it failed to reveal their divergent views as to EVANS' speed and MELBOURNE's base course, course steered, and speed (Deduction).

89. (U) At the time the signal to form column was received, the CIC Watch Officers were ENS , USN, as Evaluator, and ENS USN, as Gunnery Liaison Officer. Neither survived the collision (R, p. 112, 586).

90. (U) At no stage during the "Form Column" maneuver did either LTJG r LTJG consult with or ask for any information from the Combat Information Center or act on any information which may have been received from the Combat Information Center (Deduction).

91. (U) There is no conclusive evidence as to whether or not CIC made recommendations or provided information to the EVANS' bridge (R, p. 128; Exhibit 100, 101).

92. (U) The radar bearing of MELBOURNE, before EVANS moved in answer to the execute "Form Column" signal, which LTJG says he took as 084° was incorrect as such a bearing would have placed EVANS well to north of MELBOURNE's track throughout the maneuver (R, p. 117; Deduction).

93. (U) At the time he took the radar bearing, LTJG measured a radar range to MELBOURNE of 3,800 yards (R, p. 117).

94. (U) LTJG did not make a visual sighting of MELBOURNE before he gave the order 10° right rudder (R, p. 117).

95. (U) LTJG , who had the conn, either on his own initiative or at the direction of LTJG ordered 10° right rudder after receipt of execute "Form Column" signal (R,p. 117; Exhibits 100 and 101).

96. (U) CO EVANS was not called by the OOD, LTJG or by anyone else throughout the period from "Execute to follow form column" until collision (R, p. 124).

97. (U) At some stage during the "Form Column" maneuver, LTJG attempted a maneuvering board solution but abandoned it because he thought it was impracticable, due to the close range (Exhibit 101).

98. (U) The movement of EVANS towards her course from forward of MELBOURNE caused concern in the mind of CO MELBOURNE and he ordered the transmission of a signal telling EVANS that his course was 260° (R, p. 85, 86).

99. (U) A signal was sent to EVANS from CTU 472.1.0 meaning, "My course is 260 time 2012". The figures for the course were sent in code (Exhibit 27).

100. (U) The signal was received and receipt was transmitted by EVANS (Exhibit 27).

101. (U) Either before, at, or immediately after the "Form Column" signal was executed, CO MELBOURNE, ordered MELBOURNE's navigational lights turned on full brilliance (R, p. 168).

102. (U) Within two minutes after the execution of the "Form Column" signal, MELBOURNE's navigational lights were on at full brilliance where they remained until collision (R, p. 168, 266).

103. (U) When LTJG received the PRITAC message from the Task Unit Commander reading "JULIET SEVEN THIS IS MIKE TWO MIKE CORPEN SHACKLE ZULU UNIFORM UNIFORM LIMA UNSHACKLE TIME TWO ZERO ONE TWO," he unshackled the letters ZUUL to read 160. The correct unshackle by the code in force for 3 Jun 1969 was 260 (Exhibits 100, 101).

103.a. (U) When LTJG received a PRITAC CORPEN signal reading in its unclassified form "EVANS this is Task Unit Commander, My course is 260 TIME 2012" (ZULU TIME), he decoded the codewords representing 260 as 160. The figures 260 had been correctly coded, by the code in force at the time, and all other witnesses who decoded the figures decoded them as 260 (Exhibit 101).

104. (U) The letters ZUUL do not unshackle to 160 by the code for any day in Jun 1969.

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105. (C) By the code in force at the time the only combination of letters in any way similar to ZUUL which unshackle to 160 is NVUL.

106. (C) LTJG [redacted] received the signal MIKE CORPEN 260 TIME 2012 (Z) which he recalled at different times to read either "F CORPEN (Exhibit 100) or "M CORPEN 160" (Exhibit 101) and interpreted it to mean that MELBOURNE was coming left to a course, possibly a flying course, of 160° (Exhibits 100, 101).

106.a. (U) LTJG [redacted] incorrectly interpreted the CORPEN signal as meaning that MELBOURNE was in the process of turning left to a course, possibly a flying course, of 160° when the signal was an information signal which in fact meant, "My course is 260°".

107. (U) LTJG [redacted] was aware from visual observation that he was on MELBOURNE's port bow as EVANS heading reached about 020°-030° in her initial turn to starboard before LTJG [redacted] ordered left rudder (Exhibit 101).

108. (U) When EVANS' heading was approximately 040° during her initial right turn she bore about 245° from MELBOURNE and was at a range of about 2,600 yards (Deduction).

109. (U) After EVANS had steadied on a course of about 050°, which was a collision or near collision course, with MELBOURNE on a course of 260°, LTJG [redacted] was confused because the visual bearing of 070° which he took of MELBOURNE at this time had moved left instead of right as he expected. This was the first visual bearing he took during the maneuver (R, p. 117).

110. (U) When EVANS steadied on a course of about 050° she bore about 245° from MELBOURNE and was at a range of about 2,200 yards (Deduction).

111. (U) EVANS was seen by observers in MELBOURNE to steady on a course which the CO MELBOURNE believed to be a collision course (R, p. 86).

112. (U) CO MELBOURNE ordered the transmission of a signal to EVANS, "You are on a collision course" (R, p. 86).

113. (U) When CO MELBOURNE ordered this transmission, EVANS bore 245° from MELBOURNE and was at a range of about 2,000 yards (Deduction).

114. (U) After EVANS steadied on a course of about 050°, LTJG [redacted] either on his own initiative or at the direction of LTJG [redacted] ordered 5° or 10° of left rudder (R, p. 117).

115. (U) As EVANS began to swing slowly left with 5° or 10° left rudder, EVANS' bearing from MELBOURNE, having been steady at about 245° for about a minute, began to draw right - that is, finer on MELBOURNE's port bow (R, p. 86).

116. (U) Whatever visual checks LTJG [redacted] made of MELBOURNE did not reveal to him he was on MELBOURNE's port bow and not on MELBOURNE's starboard bow as he believed (Deduction).

117. (U) The signal from CTU 472.1.0 to EVANS, "You are on a collision course," was transmitted and due to the non receipt of a "Roger" the signal was repeated (R, p. 249).

118. (U) It is not known whether LTJG [redacted] made, with binoculars, a visual check of MELBOURNE (Exhibits 100, 101).

119. (U) MELBOURNE's port navigation light at full brillance showed LTJG [redacted] at this time a discernible aspect of the carrier (Exhibit 101).

120. (U) Red lights were observed on the bridge or directly below, on the starboard side of EVANS, after she completed her initial turn to starboard in her maneuver to take station (R, p. 170, 171, 341).

121. (U) EVANS' port and starboard running lights were on at the time of collision. There is no evidence as to who ordered or turned them on, or when they came on (R, p. 282, 264)..

122. (U) About 15-20 seconds after he heard the signal, "You are on a collision course," LTJG [redacted] ordered "Right full rudder" (Exhibit 101).

123. (U) LTJG [redacted] then transmitted to MELBOURNE, "Roger my rudder is right full over," which was receipted for by MELBOURNE (Exhibit 101).

124. (U) At approximately the same time as LTJG [redacted] order, "Right full rudder," CO MELBOURNE ordered, "Port 30 - Port 35" (Deduction).

125. (U) When the wheel orders, "Right full rudder," in EVANS, "Port 30 - Port 35," in MELBOURNE were given, the bearing of EVANS from MELBOURNE was about 247° and the range about 1200 yards (Deduction).

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126. (U) CO MELBOURNE then ordered the transmission of a signal to EVANS, "I am going hard left." He also ordered the sounding of two short blasts on the siren which was done within a few seconds (R, p. 87).

127. (U) The transmission of the signal, "I am going hard left," was commenced and completed within 15 seconds after the transmission, "Roger my rudder is right full" (deduction).

128. (U) The ships proceeded under these rudder orders (Findings of fact 120 and 122) until the collision.

129. (U) Shortly before the collision, the OOW MELBOURNE, LT ordered, "Stop both engines." The order was acknowledged by the engineroom (R, p. 170, 361).

130. (U) Shortly before the collision the JOOD EVANS, LT , ordered, "All back full." The order reached the engineroom (R, p. 117, 401).

131. (U) Immediately before the collision CO MELBOURNE ordered; "Full astern both engines." The order reached the wheelhouse as the collision occurred (R, p. 170, 361).

132. (U) At approximately 0315G, the two ships came into collision at latitude 08°-59.2N, longitude 110°-47.7E (Exhibit 61).

Signals

133. (U) From the time of the "form column" signal until collision, the sequence of signals and their meaning was as follows:

a. The transmission of the Formation ONE signal was made at approximately 0309G as follows:

MELBOURNE CHARLIE SIX THIS IS MIKE TWO- -
EXECUTE TO FOLLOW FORMATION ONE- -
CALL SIGN WHISKEY TWO CALL SIGN
JULIET SEVEN - - JULIET SEVEN OVER

EVANS JULIET SEVEN ROGER OUT

The correct translation of this signal is

MELBOURNE TU 472.1.0 from CTU 472.1.0 form column at standard distance in the sequence MELBOURNE, EVANS. EVANS over.

EVANS EVANS - Roger out

b. The next transmission was made at approximately 0310G as follows:

MELBOURNE CHARLIE SIX THIS IS MIKE TWO- -
STANDBY EXECUTE - - JULIET SEVEN OVER

EVANS JULIET SEVEN ROGER OUT

The correct translation of this signal is

MELBOURNE TU 472.1.0 from CTU 472.1.0 execute all unexecuted signals. EVANS over.

EVANS EVANS - Roger out

(This has the effect of executing the signal at a.)

c. The next transmission was made at approximately 0312G as follows:

MELBOURNE JULIET SEVEN THIS IS MIKE TWO- -
MIKE CORPEN SHACKLE ZULU UNIFORM
UNIFORM LIMA UNSHACKLE - - TIME 2012
OVER

EVANS JULIET SEVEN ROGER OUT

The correct translation of this signal is

MELBOURNE EVANS from CTU 472.1.0 my course is 260 time 2012Z over

EVANS EVANS - Roger out

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d. The next transmission was made at approximately 0313-0314 as follows:

MELBOURNE — JULIET SEVEN THIS IS MIKE TWO- - YOU ARE ON A COLLISION COURSE OVER (Pause) JULIET SEVEN YOU ARE ON A COLLISION COURSE - - JULIET SEVEN OVER

e. The next transmission was made at approximately 0314G plus, as follows:

EVANS — ROGER - - MY RUDDER IS RIGHT FULL OVER
(Note: This signal was received and understood in MELBOURNE)

f. The next transmission was commenced and completed within 15 seconds after 5 above, as follows:

MELBOURNE — JULIET SEVEN THIS IS MIKE TWO - - I AM GOING HARD LEFT OVER
(Note: This signal was received and understood in EVANS)
(Exhibit 27)

134. (U) The evidence establishes that:

a. There was a delay of ten to fifteen seconds between the time of transmission by EVANS of "Roger, my rudder is right full" and the time this information reached CO MELBOURNE at the conning position.

b. There was a delay of ten to fifteen seconds between the time CO MELBOURNE ordered that radio advice be sent to EVANS that MELBOURNE was going hard left and the time that this information was heard by LTJG [redacted] and LTJG [redacted] on the bridge loudspeakers aboard EVANS.

135. (U) On board MELBOURNE, the arrangement for reception and transmission of tactical signals on the Primary Tactical Circuit (PRITAC) was as follows:

a. The bridge operator was an enlisted rating who listened to the circuit on headphones from a position a few steps removed from the conning officer, made all transmissions on a microphone attached to his headphones, and entered in a log all signals heard and transmitted.

b. A senior tactical operator rating moved back and forth between the conning officer's position and that of the circuit operator, relaying and assisting in the translation of incoming and outgoing messages.

c. The conning officer did not himself hear incoming transmissions or personally transmit outgoing messages. (R, p. 236).

136. (U) On board EVANS, as in most USN ships, the arrangement for reception and transmission of tactical signals on the Primary Tactical Circuit was as follows:

a. Transmissions were heard on loudspeakers at the conning position (Pilot House or Open Bridge, or both), and in Combat Information Center (CIC).

b. The Officer of the Deck or his Junior Officer of the Deck guarded the circuit, recorded incoming signals for immediate use, and personally made all outgoing transmissions.

c. CIC monitored the circuit, logged signals heard (incoming or outgoing) and provided the conning officer with its interpretations of the meanings of signals heard on the circuit. (R, p. 120).

137. (U) Both the RAN and the USN systems for guarding PRITAC have advantages and disadvantages. Among these are:

a. With the RAN system the senior tactical operator shows the OOW the translation of signals as appropriate, thereby allowing the latter to devote a greater proportion of his time to navigational and deck matters. This system permits the loudspeaker on the bridge to be switched off, but if this is done there is an inherent delay for both incoming and outgoing signals, and the oral relay between circuit operator, senior tactical operator and conning officer introduces possibilities for error.

b. With the USN system, the PRITAC loudspeaker is a source of distraction on the bridge, but there is less requirement for oral relay and less time delay between transmission and the conning officer.

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Miscellaneous

138. (U) According to the Local Operations Plot in MELBOURNE's Ops Room, EVANS was at 0237G, out of her assigned screening sector and in BLACKPOOL's sector. There is no evidence that this was noted by anyone in the Task Group, except LTJG testimony that EVANS was off station shortly after he took the conn between 0230G and 0300G (Exhibit 59).

139. (U) At the time of execution of "form column" signal about 0310G, the evidence leads to the deduction that EVANS was again out of her sector and inside BLACKPOOL's sector to the left as viewed from MELBOURNE (Deduction).

140. U (C) Available tactical data (turning circles and acceleration) on USS FRANK E. EVANS and HMAS MELBOURNE are not current. The latest data obtainable for EVANS were trials on USS MOALE (DD-693) in 1944 (pre-FRAM) and for MELBOURNE were from trials on HMS TRIUMPH in 1948 (Exhibits 18 and 68).

POST COLLISION

Immediate Results and Actions

141. (U) The angle between the heading of the two ships at the time of collision was approximately 90-95 degrees (Deduction).

142. (U) The force of impact initially caused EVANS to roll deeply and violently to starboard and then divided her into two sections. The line of division was located in the vicinity of the expansion joint at frame 92 1/2 (numerous witnesses).

143. (U) The bow section rolled initially to an angle approaching 90° to starboard and did not recover appreciably (R, p. 545).

144. (U) The bow section began to settle with a marked stern down trim (R, p. 545).

145. (U) As the bow section of EVANS floated down the port side of MELBOURNE its list to starboard increased to about 150° (R, p. 458).

146. (U) The bow section rotated further to starboard and became completely inverted (R, p. 458).

147. (U) Thereupon the bow section rose up in the air by the head to an angle of about 60° and sank completely, after end first, at about 0324G (R, p. 458).

148. U (C) The bow section sank with classified items of ordnance, electronic, communications and cryptographic equipment and classified publications in 1100 fathoms of water, within approximately 600 yards of the position shown in finding of fact number 132 (H.O. Chart No. BC5498A).

148A. (U) The bow section sank in 1100 fathoms of water. (H.O. Chart No. BC5498A).

149. (U) An unknown number, not more than 73, of EVANS crew were trapped within the bow section and died as a result of traumatic injury or drowning, their bodies remaining within the ship (deduction).

150. (U) The force of the collision rolled the after section of EVANS over to starboard to an angle approaching 90°, for an undetermined but short space of time. As the ship broke into two pieces the after section righted itself (various).

151. (U) The stern section of EVANS moved slowly down the starboard side of MELBOURNE until it came abreast of MELBOURNE's starboard quarter (R, p. 418).

152. (U) In that location it was secured alongside at approximately 0325G (R, p. 418).

153. (U) at 0323G FOCAF ordered the termination of Exercise SEA SPIRIT (R, p. 26).

154. (U) At 0321G BLACKPOOL, LARSON, CLEOPATRA and KYES were ordered to close MELBOURNE to pick up survivors (R, p. 226).

155. (U) These ships encircled MELBOURNE and their boats assisted in searching the water for survivors (R, p. 229).

156. (U) Shortly after 0325G FOCAF ordered the remainder of TF 472 to close MELBOURNE for rescue operations (R, p. 12).

157. (U) Consideration was given to the use of international distress frequencies to call for assistance in the search. FOCAF decided against such action as the number of available naval ships and aircraft was more than adequate (R, p. 16).

Escape from Forward Section of EVANS

158. (U) At the time of the collision there was a total of 111 persons (10 officers and 101 enlisted men) in the portion of EVANS forward of the point where the ship broke (Exhibit 81).

159. (U) Four officers and 31 enlisted men were on watch in the forward section, distributed in the following positions: Open Bridge (3), Pilot House (5), Forward Lookout Station (atop Pilot House) (2), Signal Bridge (2), CIC (15), Radio Central (3), Forward Fireroom (4), and IC and Plotting Room (1) (Exhibit 81).

160. (U) Six officers and 70 enlisted men in the forward section were off-watch and the great majority were asleep in their assigned quarters (Exhibit 81; R, p. 453, 490, 507, 510, 544).

161. (U) There were 11 Chief Petty Officers asleep in their compartment (A-303-L); they were awakened by the collision which threw them out of their bunks (R, p. 453).

162. (U) Chief Hospital Corpsman obtained a "penlight" from his locker and passed it to the Chief Petty Officer who was at the head of the line climbing towards the hatch. HMC took last place in the line (R, p. 453).

163. (U) All Chief Petty Officers except HMC exited the Chief Petty Officers' compartment (R, p. 453).

164. (U) HMC did not survive (Exhibit 90).

165. (U) Chief Boatswain's Mate and Chief Engineman who are known to have exited the Chief Petty Officers' compartment, did not survive (R, p. 454, Exhibit 90).

166. (U) Thirty two enlisted men were asleep in the First Division compartment (A-304-L). They were awakened by the collision which threw them from their bunks (R, p. 487, 507).

167. (U) The collision caused some confusion and shouting in the First Division compartment (R, p. 488, 490).

168. (U) Either Boatswain's Mate Second Class or Boatswain's Mate Second Class called out "Keep quiet, stay together and we will get out of here" and this quieted the men in First Division compartment (R, p. 490).

169. (U) Six enlisted men from First Division Compartment survived. Petty Officer Sage was not a survivor (R, p. 507, Exhibit 81, 90).

170. (U) In the OI Division compartment (A-305-CL) 20 enlisted men were asleep. They were awakened by the collision which threw them from their bunks (R, p. 510).

171. (U) Radarman First Class called out "Let's get out of here", and this started a general movement towards the ladder (R, p. 510).

172. (U) Ten enlisted men from OI Division compartment survived. Petty Officer did not survive (Exhibit 90, R, p. 511).

173. (U) In the forward section the only others to survive from among those off watch were two officers (Commander and Lieutenant Commander), two Chief Petty Officers sleeping in a room just forward of the Wardroom, and one enlisted man who was awake in the crew's Messroom (A-205-L) (R, p. 70, 544, Exhibit 81, 90).

174. (U) Of those on watch in the forward section, 2 officers on the open bridge, the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch in the pilot house, 1 lookout, 2 signalmen and 2 enlisted men in Radio Central, were the only survivors (Exhibit 81, 90).

175. (U) No one survived from the Forward Fireroom, CIC, Forward Officers Quarters and the IC and Plotting Room (Exhibit 81, 90).

176. (U) Of the total of 10 officers and 101 enlisted men in the forward portion of the ship, 4 officers and 33 enlisted men survived (Exhibit 81, 90).

177. (U) Those in the forward section who were awakened by the collision, by being thrown from their bunks, found themselves standing or lying on the starboard side of their compartments and had great difficulty in orienting themselves and selecting an escape route (R, p. 453, 490, 507, 510, 544).

178. (U) There was little or no panic in any portion of the forward section of the ship (R, p. 490, 510).

179. (U) Whenever one man found a hatch or escape route he called out the way to those around him (R, p. 453, 488, 489, 512, 544).

180. (U) There was no available general means of communication from leaders to their men (deduction).

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181. (U) The men trying to effect their escape from within the ship had to climb, and in some cases swim, through compartments which were 90° from the normal, in darkness and semi-darkness (R, p. 453, 488, 489, 512, 544).

182. (U) In those compartments of the forward section containing a number of men some of whom were survivors, i.e., CPO's Berthing, First Division and OI Division, direction by leaders occurred (R, p. 453, 490, 507, 510).

183. (U) The survivors from the forward section entered the water either individually as they emerged from below decks, or in a few cases in small groups temporarily gathered on the hull (R, p. 455, 489).

184. (U) No formal order to abandon the forward portion of the ship was given (R, p. 71).

185. (U) CO EVANS, who was without means of general communications to his men called out to jump clear before he left the hull (R, p. 70).

186. (U) The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander , who was without means of general communication to his men, called out to get off before he left the hull (R, p. 546).

187. (U) In the water, some of the men were in small scattered groups; others found no one in close proximity (R, p. 472, 455).

188. (U) When MELBOURNE's boat approached them, many of the survivors indicated that the boat should first pick up others who, they believed, were in more immediate need of help (R, p. 71, 475).

189. (U) The last survivor from the bow section was landed onboard MELBOURNE by helicopter at approximately 0345 (R, p. 467).

190. (U) At least three men are known to have left their original compartments but did not become survivors (R, p. 454, 511).

191. (U) It is not known whether the loss of these men (finding of fact 190) should be attributed to their becoming trapped before clearing the ship or to injury or to drowning (R, p. 454, 511, deduction).

192. (U) Seaman Apprentice was on watch at the Forward Lookout Station atop the Pilot House. There is evidence that immediately before the collision he tripped and became entangled with the cord of his JL circuit headset. SA body was recovered from the water by MELBOURNE's No 2. Motor Cutter. His death was due to drowning and he had suffered injuries to the head and chest (R, p. 336, 477, Exhibit 102).

193. (U) Seaman Y was Boatswain's Mate of the Watch inside the pilot house at the time of collision; he was thrown into the water (R, p. 386, 387).

194. (U) Seaman PETTY climbed back on board the forward section and opened and held open the weather door leading from the main deck to the vestibule at the forward end of the port passage, A-101-LM, immediately aft of the Wardroom, port side (R, p. 387,511).

195. (U) The door which Seaman PETTY opened was in a horizontal position because the forward section of the ship was on its starboard side (deduction).

196. (U) Sixteen men from First Division and OI Division berthing compartments escaped through the door which Seaman Petty had opened (R, p. 386, 489).

197. (U) Seaman Apprentice as on top of the Signal Shelter on the Signal Bridge of EVANS at the time of the collision. He was thrown from there directly to MELBOURNE's Flight Deck. He was quickly taken below to the Sickbay where he was found to have suffered a B6 ., p. 380, 284, Exhibit 33).

Escape from After Section of EVANS

198. (U) At the time of the collision there was a total of 162 personnel (8 officers and 154 enlisted men) in the portion of EVANS aft of Frame 92 1/2, where the ship broke (Exhibit 81).

199. (U) Twenty-three enlisted men were on watch in the after section distributed in the following positions: Forward Engineroom (6), After Engineroom (4), After Fireroom (5), Steering Aft (2), After Lookout Station on ECM Deck (1), VDS Booth (1), Sounding and Security Patrol (1), Dash Hanger (2), and Laundry (1) (Exhibit 81).

200. (U) Everyone else in the after section was asleep in his normal sleeping quarters (Exhibit 81 - numerous witnesses).

201. (U) There were 6 enlisted men in the Forward Engineroom who took immediate action to avoid being trapped and drowned in the compartment which flooded to within about 4 feet of the overhead very rapidly (R, p. 397, 401, etc.).

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202. (U) At about the time of collision, in the forward engineroom, a sound powered telephone cord became entangled on the foot of FN but he managed to free himself and escape (R, p. 571).

203. (U) All personnel in the Forward Engineroom except one fireman received first and second degree burns from high temperature steam escaping from the severed main steam line requiring their hospitalization (R, p. 398, 402, etc; Exhibit 33).

204. (U) Whenever one man found the hatch he called out the way to others in the Forward Engineroom (R, p. 398, 402, etc.).

205. (U) Firema pulled Machinist's Mate Third Class over to the hatch and assiste through before leaving the engineroom himself (R, p. 402).

206. (U) Machinist's Mate First Class in charge of watch in the After Engineroom, ordered everyone to evacuate the engineroom immediately after he picked himself up after being thrown down to the starboard side by the collision (R, p. 410, 414).

207. (U) Four enlisted men, followed by Petty Officer immediately evacuated the After Engineroom (R, p. 414).

208. (U) LT , USN, EVANS Operations Officer, was the senior officer in the after section. He was asleep in his stateroom at the time of collision (R, p. 433, 432).

209. (U) As soon as LT eft his stateroom a few seconds after collision he began to shout orders for the crew to go to their General Quarters Stations (R, p. 432, 450).

210. (U) When LT aw that EVANS was no longer a complete ship, he went to the fantail and took charge of the men assembled there. He was assisted in this and in other actions which he initiated by the other officers on board (R, p. 433 and numerous witnesses).

211. (U) LTJG was in his stateroom at the time of collision. He heard a shouted order to go to General Quarters. When he left his stateroom and found the forward part of the ship gone, he told members of the crew assembling on the main deck of the situation and ordered them to the fantail (R, p. 450).

212. (U) The crew of EVANS assembled on the fantail were orderly and calm (R, p. 450, 463, numerous).

213. (U) LTJG , among others, undertook the gathering of lifejackets from various storages in the after section (R, p. 450).

214. (U) LTJG irected men on EVANS in assisting to secure lines passed from MELBOURNE to secure the stern section (R, p. 451).

215. (U) Lieutenant USNR, the Supply Officer of EVANS, rendered first aid to the injured personnel who had been assembled on the fantail (R, p. 557/8).

216. (U) LT sed bandages and aspirins from the EVANS first aid bags stowed in the EVANS stern section, and gave the injured some relief for the short period before they were evacuated to MELBOURNE (R, p. 558).

217. (U) Machinery Repairman First Class after attempting to go to his General Quarters Station, returned to his berthing compartment, R. Division (C-203-L) and ordered the men to clear the compartment and go to the fantail (R, p. 498).

218. (U) Petty Officer assisted with the securing of lines passed by MELBOURNE to the stern section and directed the movement of men from the midships section to the MELBOURNE (R, p. 499, 502).

219. (U) Signalman First Class after attempting to go to his General Quarters Station, returned to his berthing compartment, OC Division (C-205-L) and ordered the men to clear the compartment and go to the fantail (R, p. 503).

220. (U) Signalman and Quartermaster Second Class passed through the after berthing compartments, setting damage control condition ZEBRA and ordering the men to clear the compartments and go to the fantail (R, p. 504).

221. (U) Signalman and QM searched the berthing compartments to ensure that no one remained (R, p. 504).

222. (U) Seaman Apprentice as on watch in After Steering (C-206-E), ready to take control should a casualty occur to the normal steering system (R, p. 390, 504, 392).

223. (U) SA was thrown against the starboard side by the collision; as soon as he picked himself up he went to his post, engaged the controls and tried to contact the bridge on the 1JV telephone (R, p. 390, 394).

224. (U) SA remained at his post, put the rudder amidships and kept calling the bridge until told by Signalman to secure the phones and leave the compartment (R, p. 390, 504).

225. (U) Signalman reported to LT that the after berthing compartments were clear and that condition ZEBRA was set. In response to LT call for volunteers, Signalman and Boiler Tender Third Clas ent into the water to attempt to tow three of MELBOURNE's inflated liferafts about 75 feet to EVANS (R, p. 504).

226. (U) Electrician's Mate Third Class and Fireman entered the After Fireroom, which by then had been evacuated, to search for a man after they had heard knocking. They found no one. They also entered the After Engineroom (R, p. 519, 524).

227. (U) Petty Officer ook charge in R Division compartment (C-203-L) (R, p. 521).

228. (U) Petty Officers in "M" Division berthing compartment calmed the men who were thrown out of their bunks by the collision (R, p. 523).

229. (U) LT ganized the collection and distribution of lifejackets (R, p. 433).

230. (U) LT rdered life rafts to be launched and an attempt to be made to cut free the boat which was hanging by one fall from her starboard davits (R, p. 433).

231. (U) L rganized a collection of all wounded personnel on the fantail and ordered that they be evacuated to MELBOURNE as soon as he was informed there was a ladder connecting the ships (R, p. 433).

232. (U) MM3 was lifted on board MELBOURNE by stretcher; the other injured climbed the ladder to MELBOURNE's quarterdeck (R, p. 463).

233. (U) LT rdered a search of the after section to ensure that all compartments were clear of men and that damage control condition ZEBRA was set (R, p. 434).

234. (U) LTJG USN, Engineer Officer, was asleep in his stateroom at the time of collision. When he left his room after the collision he went immediately to the Forward Engineroom; he found it flooded and empty of personnel. He dogged the hatch closed (R, p. 438).

235. (U) LTJG proceeded from the Forward Engineroom direct to the After Engineroom, where he found the plant secured; he checked that the bulkhead stops were closed (R, p. 438).

236. (U) LTJG ent from the After Engineroom to the After Fireroom and completed securing of the boiler by switching off one burner. He also inspected the forward bulkhead observed that it was "panting" and made an unsuccessful attempt to discover from whence the water he could see in the bilges was entering the fireroom (R, p. 438, 439).

237. (U) LTJG hen went to the fantail and reported to Lieutenant it the after engineroom and fireroom were secured and informed Lieutenant t in his opinion the ship was in a critical condition. He recommended that those on the ship be evacuated (R, p. 439).

238. (U) LTJG rdered First Class Interior Communications Man id First Class Shipfitter o search all the spaces below decks aft of the engineering spaces and to set condition ZEBRA. LTJG also made two personal searches before he left the ship (R, p. 440).

239. (U) LT , who had also received advice from the Executive Officer of MELBOURNE to the effect that the after section was in a dangerous condition, ordered the USN personnel on EVANS to be evacuated to MELBOURNE (R, p. 441, 420).

240. (U) The stern section of EVANS was evacuated under the supervision of officers and senior enlisted men via a ladder, scrambling nets and jacob's ladders led from the flight deck and from the quarterdeck of MELBOURNE to the ECM Deck and to the main deck of EVANS (R, p. 420 and numerous).

241. (U) By 0400G the Engineer Officers of MELBOURNE and EVANS concurred in the view that the stern section of EVANS was settling by the head and was in a critical condition (R, p. 420, 439).

242. (U) The Executive Officer of MELBOURNE consulted individually with both of these officers. All three concluded that the stern section would shortly sink (R, p. 420, 441).

243. (U) The Executive Officer of MELBOURNE reported the situation to the CO MELBOURNE and advised that the stern section be cast off as it might cause damage in settling to MELBOURNE's starboard screw (R, p. 228, 420).

244. (U) CO MELBOURNE withheld permission to cast off until the Executive Officer had personally conducted a thorough search of all compartments in the after section (R, p. 228).

245. (U) LTJG left EVANS followed by Lieutenant who was the last of the USN personnel to leave (R, p. 441).

246. (U) Having received an assurance from his Executive Officer that there were no survivors in EVANS, CO MELBOURNE, after consultation with FOCAF, gave permission to cast off (R, p. 16).

247. (U) At 0407G lines were cast off and with a touch ahead on MELBOURNE's port engine the stern section drifted clear (R, p. 420).

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MELBOURNE Search and Rescue Operations

248. (U) At the moment of impact CO MELBOURNE ordered "Emergency Stations" (R, p. 226).

249. (U) By such action crews were stationed at all boats, personnel stood by to lower ladders of all types and medical parties and storeroom personnel were alerted (R, p. 226, 418).

250. (U) Immediately after the collision CO MELBOURNE called away all boats and ordered the release of liferafts and lifebuoys (R, p. 226, 418).

251. (U) MELBOURNE's number 2 motor cutter was lowered into the water from davits on the port side forward within 4-5 minutes of the collision (R, p. 472).

252. (U) This boat picked up approximately 29 survivors on its first trip, the majority of whom were concentrated in a small area the center of which was located between 60 and 200 yards from MELBOURNE (R, p. 472).

253. (U) The crew of No. 2 motor cutter also recovered a body from the water and lifted it into the boat (R, p. 478).

254. (U) Resuscitation measures (Cardiac massage) were initiated immediately but discontinued due to concern over chest injuries noted. This body was later identified as that of Seaman Apprentice (R, p. 476).

255. (U) On her second trip the motor cutter towed back three liferafts containing approximately five survivors (R, p. 473).

256. (U) FOCAF's barge, though manned, could not be lowered into the water until approximately 10 minutes after impact because the stern section of EVANS fouled the boat's gantry (R, p. 419).

257. (U) The barge picked up eight men (R, p. 419).

258. (U) MELBOURNE's other boat, known as the utility boat, was unserviceable having suffered damage in Manila Bay (R, p. 419).

259. (U) Scrambling nets, drifter ladders and later the port accommodation ladder were lowered to assist survivors to board MELBOURNE (R, p. 419).

260. (U) A number of men from MELBOURNE, some acting on their own initiative, entered the water to assist survivors. A complete list of those in this category is not available but it is known that ME , AB and LT entered the water and assisted survivors into liferafts (R, p. 418, 428, 481).

261. (U) LT umped from 3 deck (18 feet above water) to assist an injured man into a liferaft and rendered first aid (R, p. 428).

262. (U) When the liferaft had drifted 150-200 yards away from MELBOURNE, LT swam a further 150-200 yards from the ship to assist a second survivor into a raft (R, p. 429).

263. (U) LT ubsequently swam away to search an area of water of unknown size before returning to the second raft (R, p. 428-430).

264. (U) At least 6 liferafts were released from MELBOURNE's port side forward and one from each quarter. Four lifebuoys were thrown from the stern. In the area investigated by LT , that is in the general direction of where the bow section of EVANS sank, there were several liferafts some of which were Australian and others American (R, p. 430).

265. (U) The combined capacity of the 8 MELBOURNE rafts was 160 men.

266. (U) In addition to the rafts dropped by MELBOURNE, EVANS dropped at least three more, which had a combined capacity of 45 men (R, p. 430, 587).

267. (U) CO MELBOURNE used his engines to place MELBOURNE's starboard quarter alongside EVANS stern section and noted that action was taken to secure EVANS alongside (R, p. 227).

268. (U) Petty Officer ..... took charge on the quarterdeck of MELBOURNE initially and provided the first line used to secure EVANS stern section alongside MELBOURNE (R, p. 462).

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269. (U) LCDR and others used MELBOURNE's safety nets to go aboard EVANS via her hangar top (R, p. 292).

270. (U) Wessex helicopter cargo nets were rigged from the starboard quarter of MELBOURNE's flight deck to EVANS by Chief Aircraftman Aircraft Handler and others (R, p. 292, 366).

271. (U) CPO reported to an officer on EVANS fantail that nets had been rigged "up top" and he could start getting men off (R, p. 366).

272. (U) LCDR assisted in directing survivors to board MELBOURNE via an aluminum ladder and Wessex helicopter cargo nets between the ships (R, p. 293).

273. (U) LCDR searched under debris on EVANS decks and searched for men in the compartments he was able to enter below decks (R, p. 293).

274. (U) CPO persisted in his efforts to help in EVANS until he had to be ordered off the ship by LCDR (R, p. 294).

275. (U) FOCAF ordered that all wreckage in the water was to be picked up to ensure that the search was complete in all respects (R, p. 16).

276. (U) A final systematic search by ships assisted by elicopters was initiated at 0900G and continued until about 1900G. This search covered an area of approximately 100 square miles (Exhibit 6; R, p. 15).

277. (U) Two MELBOURNE helicopters (831 and 823) were airborne at the time of collision were recalled 2 minutes after impact (Exhibit 78).

278. (U) At 0330 Helicopter 831 rescued LCDR Executive Officer of EVANS. The loading of this aircraft limited its capacity to lifting one survivor at a time (R, p. 465, 466).

279. (U) Helicopter No. 823 was not fitted with a winch and used its landing lamp to direct a boat to swimmers (Exhibit 78).

280. (U) Shortly after 0325G FOCAF asked COMASWGRU ONE to send helicopters and ordered MELBOURNE to launch helicopters (R, p. 12).

281. (U) Within 14 minutes of impact Helicopters no. 830 and 828 were launched by MELBOURNE equipped with rescue winches (Exhibit 78).

282. (U) At 0340G Helicopter no. 830, while searching beyond the wreckage perimeter, lowered his SAR diver and rescued an exhausted swimmer (R, p. 455, Exhibit 78).

283. (U) This survivor, SKC , was the last man to reach MELBOURNE (R, p. 467, 455).

284. (U) At about 0335, SH3 helicopters from KEARSARGE joined the search having flown a distance of about 40 miles (Exhibit 78; R, p. 355).

285. (U) The search area was divided by MELBOURNE into 60 degree sectors and each helicopter was ordered to search within his sector to a depth of 5 miles. Subsequently, the area was divided into 8 sectors (R, p. 422; Exhibit 45, 71).

286. (U) Air search was continued throughout the day and discontinued at 1805G (R, p. 467).

287. (U) During hours of darkness helicopters gave assistance to search boats by illuminating survivors and wreckage (R, p. 470, Exhibit 78).

288. (U) The number of helicopters in use varied from 2 to 8 at any time, of which five were provided by USS KEARSARGE (R, p. 355, Exhibits 71, 78).

289. (U) By 0345 all survivors were on board MELBOURNE (R, p. 421).

290. (U) By 0440 it had been established that the survivors totalled 199 and details of their next of kin were at hand (R, p. 421).

291. (U) After CO EVANS had been rescued from the water and brought aboard MELBOURNE he expressed to CO MELBOURNE the desire to return to his ship. CO MELBOURNE, observing him to be very shocked and in pain, convinced him that he should remain aboard MELBOURNE and look after his men (R, p. 229, 583).

292. (U) Injured survivors were treated in MELBOURNE's sick bay or wardroom (R, p. 421).

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293. (U) Survivors were provided with hot beverages, food, clothing, and cigarettes (R, p. 421).

294. (U) Many of the survivors paid special tribute to the quality of the treatment extended to them by MELBOURNE personnel (R, p. 403, 406, 499, 505, 513, 517).

295. (U) Between 0900G and 1000G the uninjured survivors were transferred via boat to KEARSARGE while the more seriously injured were transported by helicopter (R, p. 421).

Reboarding and Salvage of Stern Section of EVANS

296. (U) CO LARSON took charge of the abandoned stern section of EVANS (R, p. 444, 550).

297. (U) At about dawn, 3 June 1969, LTJG , accompanied by Boiler Tender First Class and Machinery Repairman First Class left MELBOURNE by MELBOURNE's No. 2 Motor Cutter to return to the stern section of EVANS (R, p. 443, 444).

298. (U) LTJG boat circled the stern section and LTJG observed that the forward end had settled about one foot since his last inspection before evacuating the ship (R, p. 443).

299. (U) LTJG then proceeded to LARSON and joined the Engineer Officer of LARSON, Lieutenant USN, who was organizing a party to board the stern section of EVANS (R, p. 444).

300. (U) LTJG and LT accompanied by LARSON's Damage Control Assistant, two Chief Petty Officers and four other enlisted men boarded the stern section of EVANS from a boat to ascertain salvage possibilities, assist therein and to recover such essential records, classified, accountable and pilferable materials as possible (R, p. 444).

301. (U) They found flooding in the After Fireroom to a level above the mud drum of the boiler (R, p. 444).

302. (U) Water was entering the After Fireroom through one hole about 8" in diameter and another smaller hole, both apparently caused by pipes being pulled through the bulkhead between the After Fireroom and the After Engineroom (R, p. 444).

303. (U) The holes between the After Fireroom and After Engineroom were plugged under LTJG direction by Damage Control Plugs (R, p. 444).

304. (U) LARSON's portable P250 gasoline pump was used to pump water from the After Fireroom (R, p. 444).

305. (U) EVANS' portable P250 gasoline pump was found to have broken spark plug wires, but would not function when these had been replaced (R, p. 444).

306. (U) The salvage party cut loose EVANS' motor whaleboat, which was hanging by one fall. The boat floated and was recovered by KYES (R, p. 445).

307. (U) LARSON came alongside the starboard side of the stern section and secured it, LARSON's bow towards EVANS' stern (Photo).

308. (U) 440 volt electric power was led from LARSON to EVANS and the leads were plugged directly into EVANS' portable electric pumps, which were then put to work pumping out the After Fireroom. EVANS' portable cutting torch was used to cut free equipment to lighten the ship (R, p. 445).

309. (U) Water was also removed by pumping from After Officers' Quarters and passageways (R, p. 445).

310. (U) Pumping the water out of the flooded spaces noticeably improved the stability of the stern section which had been sluggish but now had better reaction characteristics (R, p. 445).

311. (U) EVANS' Variable Depth Sonar towed body, which was streamed to a depth of about 150 feet, was raised by the salvage party using power from LARSON (R, p. 446).

312. (U) The salvage party rigged a towing bridle (R, p. 446).

313. (U) Before he was required to leave the stern section, LTJG checked that Condition ZEBRA was set in the stern section, and inspected and closed down the magazines (R, p. 447).

314. (U) At approximately 0900G, the Supply and Disbursing Officer of EVANS, LTJG , SC, USNR, reboarded the after section. On that and a subsequent visit, he recovered essentially all currency, treasury checks, and money orders for which he was accountable, in addition to records he considered essential (R, p. 559).

315. (U) Ship's store stock stores, repair parts remained aboard EVANS until arrival Subic Bay and were subsequently disposed of in accordance with applicable directives (R, p. 560).

316. (U) Prior to the collision the Supply and Disbursing Officer of EVANS had attempted and was unable to find any official instructions or guidance relating to steps he should follow in the event of a disaster such as actually happened. (R, p. 560).

317. (U) Navy Regulations, 1948, Art. 1902, and NAVCOMP Manual, Art. 042553, address the duties of accountable officers in the event of disaster and the procedures for the disposition of funds in the hands of disbursing officers. These apply to EVANS' situation in only a general manner. (Relevant publications).

318. (U) USS TAWASA (ATF-92) arrived at the scene at 1140G and placed salvage personnel on board the stern section to complete preparations for tow (Exhibit 86).

319. (U) Lieutenant Commander , Salvage Engineer for Harbor Clearance Unit I, assumed the duties of Officer in Charge of Salvage Operations at 1700G. CO USS TAWASA assumed duties as On Scene Commander (Exhibit 86).

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320. (U) LCDR _____ fully approved the actions taken prior to his arrival by LARSON and EVANS' personnel towards salvage and preparation for tow (R, p. 563).

321. (U) TAWASA commenced the tow of the stern section of EVANS at 1515G, 4 June. The tow proceeded uneventfully except for the parting of the towing bridle at 0130, 8 June. The tow was resecured. The stern section of EVANS was transferred to CO EVANS on arrival Subic Bay at 0600H, 9 June (Exhibit 86).

Emergency Lighting in EVANS

322. (U) From the moment of the collision, normal ship's lighting failed in the forward section of EVANS (R, p. 70, 453, 487, 507, 544).

323. (U) EVANS' forward diesel generator room is on the starboard side, second platform (below the waterline) approximately 35 feet forward of the point of collision impact (Exhibit 44).

324. (U) There is no evidnce regarding the condition or functioning of EVANS' forward diesel generator after the collision.

325. (U) EVANS' after diesel generator set functioned as designed, in that it automatically started and generated power immediately after the collision (R, p. 440, 496).

326. (U) Emergency power was thereby made available direct to the steering gear, and to the after emergency switchboard (R, p. 440, 574, 575).

327. (U) Emergency power, though available, was not distributed to other vital circuits in the after section of the ship due to interruption of emergency power distribution circuitry from the diesel generator through the after emergency switchboard (located in the after diesel generator room) (R, p. 574, 575).

328. (U) Two types of emergency lights were installed in EVANS. On both, the light source is battery powered. They differ principally in the manner in which the light is turned on. They are:

a. Manually-operated on-off switch.

b. Relay-actuated on-off switch, such that the light is turned on automatically upon loss of ship's power to the lighting circuits (Knowledge of Board).

329. (U) Subsequent to the collision one emergency battle lantern actuated automatically in B-2 (Forward Engineroom) (R, p. 403).

330. (U) Subsequent to the collision, one or more emergency battle lanterns actuated automatically in A-303-L (CPO Berthing), A-304-L (1st Division's Berthing), B-101-ACEL (After Officers' Quarters), B-4 (After Engineroom), B-101-ACEL (fore and aft main passage), C-202-E (After Emergency Diesel Room), C-203-E (General Machine Shop), C-203-L (M Division Berthing), C-204-LM (OC Division Berthing), C-205-L (2nd Division Berthing), C-206-E (After Steering) (R, p. 212, 392, 413, 438, 453, 496, 498, 507, 515).

331. (U) Subsequent to the collision, emergency battle lanterns did not actuate in A-203-1M (CPO Mess), A-101-LM (Wardroom), or A-101-LM (passageway forward of Wardroom), either because of defective fucntioning, or because no automatic types were located in those spaces (R, p. 510, 544).

332. (U) Subsequent to the collision, one manually operated battle lantern was found lying on the deck near its normal mounting, and at least one relay actuated lantern was forcibly removed from its mounting and used as a portable light (R, p. 519, 522).

333. (U) "General specifications for Building ships in the U.S. Navy," as interpreted by CO EVANS, contain conflicting specifications with regard to installation of relay actuated battle lanterns.

Example:

a. Sect. 9640-2, Page 4A (Rev. 10 Oct 1968) provides for installation of these lanterns to mark escape routes.

b. Sect. 9640-2, Page 5, of 1 July 1967, prohibits installation in spaces not manned during battle conditions (R, p. 590).

334. (U) Evidence was presented to the effect that CO's of individual USN ships have wide latitude in determining the numbers, types and locations of emergency lights (R, p. 578).

Life Rafts

335. (U) Twenty-one 15-man inflatable rafts were installed in EVANS, equating to 115% of persons on board (Exhibit 96; R, p. 587).

336. (U) In August - September 1968 all rafts had been checked and defective units replaced (R, p. 587).

337. (U) Five rafts were stowed port side in the bridge area, 4 below the signal bridge level, 1 further aft. These rafts were in the vicinity of the point of impact (R, p. 587).

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338. (U) Two uninflated rafts with broken static lines were found port side forward main deck of EVANS during salvage operations (R, p. 501).

339. (U) LTJG ssisted by Gunner's Mate Second Class launched 3 - 4 life rafts from starboard side racks and inflated 2. They left the others uninflated in their valises when ordered to board MELBOURNE (R, p. 529).

340. (U) In the general area of the bow section there were about 4 U.S. rafts and 4 Australian rafts seen to be functioning properly (R, p. 429, 430).

Life Jackets

341. (U) According to an inventory of life jackets conducted in February 1969 EVANS had on board a total of 315 life jackets of the following types:

70 Kapok

245 Yoke type CO_2 inflatable

This equates to 115% of personnel on board the EVANS (R, p. 493).

342. (U) EVANS' inflatable life jackets were distributed in the vicinity of General Quarters Stations. Kapok life jackets were distributed in the vicinity of line working stations for underway replenishment and in the ship's motor whaleboat (R, p. 493; Exhibit 84).

343. (U) Personnel whose General Quarters stations were on the bridge or in exposed areas also used Kapok jackets (R, p. 493).

344. (U) EVANS checked that all hands had life jackets each time the crew exercised at General Quarters. Any maldistributions were immediately corrected. No inadequacies in the number available had ever been reported (R, p. 493).

345. (U) Life jackets had been available to all hands (273 people) at abandon ship drills (R, p. 490).

346. (U) The total number of personnel in the after section of the ship at the time of collision was 162, of whom 139 were asleep or in their quarters and 23 were on watch or working (Exhibit 84).

347. (U) There were 95 General Quarters stations in the section of EVANS which remained afloat. All General Quarters stations in the after part of the ship had inflatable life jackets at those stations (Exhibit 84).

348. (U) The approximate total number of life jackets available in the after part of the EVANS was 140 of which 92 were of the inflatable type and 48 were Kapok type (R, p. 494; Exhibit 84).

349. (U) In the forward section of EVANS, there is no evidence that anyone attempted to obtain life jackets prior to making his escape from the ship even though at least one person (XO EVANS) had two life jackets in the immediate vicinity of his bunk (R, p. 547, numerous witnesses).

Deaths and Injuries

350. (U) As a result of the collision, Seaman Apprentice Kenneth W. GLINES, USN, B64 83 82, was drowned. His body was recovered and returned to KEARSARGE from MELBOURNE. The body was identified by dental records (Exhibits 34, 102).

351. (U) SA GLINES' body was thereafter transferred to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN, for preparation and shipment to CONUS (Exhibit 102).

352. (U) Although the Senior Medical Officer, KEARSARGE, had intended that an autopsy should be performed on SA GLINES, no request was made to Tan Son Nhut Air Base to this effect and no autopsy was performed (Exhibit 102).

353. (U) As a result of the collision, the following named naval personnel were lost at sea, their deaths being attributed to traumatic injuries or drowning and their bodies not being recovered:

ARMSTRONG, Alan H., ENS, 734324/1100
BRANDON, Robert G., ENS, 734145/1105
NORTON, John T., ENS, 732553/1105
OGAWA, Gregory K., ENS, 748383/1105
PATTEE, Dwight S., ENS 731886/1100
STEVER, Jon K., LTJG, 733570/1105
BAKER, James R., SN, B48 68 71
BOTTO, Andrew J., SN, B81 39 26
BOX, Thomas B., SN, B42 37 06
BRADLEY, James F., ETN3, B10 55 28
BROWN, Harris M., SA, B54 18 27
BROWN, William D. II, BT2, B98 07 23
CANNINGTON, Charles W., HMC, 996 14 06
CARLSON, Christopher J., RD2, 915 50 84
CLAWSON, Michael K., SN, B84 61 94

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CLUTE, Benny V., SN, B89 13 83
CMEYLA, James, R., YN3, B54 25 89
COOL, Larry W., ETN3 794 99 23
CORCORAN, Patrick M., SN, B45 01 59
CRAIG, Joe E., SA, B86 34 70
DAVIS, James N., ETR3, B52 94 89
DEAL, Leon L., SA, B86 34 76
DYKES, James F. III, SN, B43 57 43
EARLEY, Raymond J., SA, B44 68 97
ESPINOSA, Steven F., GMG3, B81 26 76
FAGAN, Stephen D., SA, B43 86 64
FIELDS, William D., SA, B86 34 73
FLUMMER, Alan C., SA, B86 34 71
FRYE, Henry K., SA, B86 81 34
GARCIA, Francis J., SN, B84 17 27
GARDNER, Melvin H., STG3, 918 10 96
GEARHART, Donald E., SA, B44 59 01
GLENNON, Patrick G., BM3, B60 77 78
GONZALEZ, Joe L., SA, B73 18 43
GRACELY, Larry A., STG3, B42 18 37
GRISSOM, Devere R., Jr., SA, B86 79 69
GUYER, Steven A., SA, B64 83 79
HENDERSON, Terry L., RD3, B40 76 13
HESS, Edward P., EMC, 499 39 77
HODGSON, Garry B., RD2, 457 43 21
JOHNSTON, Dennis R., SA, B52 68 62
KERR, James W., SA, B86 82 88
KING, Willie L., BMC, 483 56 75
LALIBERTE, George J., RD1, 486 80 93
LEBRUN, Ray P., RM2, 997 45 60
LEHMAN, Eugene F., RD1, 450 71 22
LYONS, Isaac (n), SA, B86 82 89
MEISTER, Douglas R., SA, B54 18 44
MELENDREZ, Andrew M., SA, B86 81 36
MESSIER, Frederic C., SN, B14 71 52
MILLER, Timothy L., SA, B56 10 35
ORLIKOWSKI, Michael, SA, B54 39 19
ORPURT, Linden R., IC2, B51 75 73
PENNELL, Craig A., SA, B86 80 71
PICKETT, Jerome (n), SA, B53 81 99
PRESTON, Earl F. Jr., YN2, B11 16 48
REILLY, Lawrence J. Jr., BT3, 677 37 43
RIKAL, Victor T., RD2, 139 15 34
SAGE, Gary L., BM2, B60 86 79
SAGE, Gregory A., RD3, B60 93 22
SAGE, Kelly J., SA, B63 97 91
SAUVEY, John A., SA, B42 62 62
SEARLE, Robert J., BTFA, B89 93 32
SMITH, Gerald W., FA, B51 97 77
SMITH, Thurston P., Jr., SN, B38 34 93
SPRAY, John R., STG2, 920 09 18
TALLON, Thomas F., SA, 779 07 24
THIBODEAU, Ronald A., RD2, B80 12 91
THOMAS, Jon W., RD3, B52 74 48
TOLAR, John T., SA, B86 82 87
VIGUE, Gary J., QM3, B11 98 19
WARNOCK, Con W., RD3, B71 74 03
WEST, Henry D. III, SA, B33 38 52

354. (U) Death reports on all the personnel listed in Findings of Facts 350 and 353 have been submitted on NAVJAG Form 5800/16 (Exhibit 34).

355. (U) As a result of the collision, the following named EVANS personnel suffered injuries which resulted in their inability to perform duty for a period exceeding 24 hours:

, BTCS, 455 11 02 B6
FN, B52 18 25 B6
, FN, B21 13 26 B6
, FA, B63 44 81 B6
B6
MM3, B50 37 61 B6
SA, B82 64 47 B6
B6

Injuries redacted

(Exhibits 33, 35, 82, 83; R, p. 398, 402, 405, 572)

356. (U) There were no personnel casualties in MELBOURNE as a result of the collision (Exhibit 47).

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Damage to Ships

357. (U) As a result of the collision, MELBOURNE suffered extensive damage to her bow, both above and below water, as described in Exhibit 110. The full extent of damage and cost of repair were not available to the Board prior to the submission of its report (Exhibit 110).

358. (U) Flooding occurred in MELBOURNE's No. 1 and 2 trim tanks and shoring operations were commenced against number sixteen bulkhead from five deck to the keel. This was completed by 1500G, 3 June, and the ship was able to proceed to Singapore at 15 knots when search operations were completed (R,p. 396).

359. (U) As a result of the collision, the hull of EVANS forward of frame 92 1/2 was lost, together with all equipment, supplies and ammunition installed or stored therein (various; Exhibit 89).

360. (U) The after section of EVANS was salvaged, but reconstruction of the missing half was found to be unwarranted. Condition of the stern section upon arrival at Subic Bay was as described in Exhibit 89 (Exhibit 89).

Disposition of EVANS

361. (U) On 12 June 1969 the Chief of Naval Operations ordered that EVANS be decommissioned on 1 July 1969 (R, p. 583).

362. (U) CO EVANS decommissioned EVANS on 1 July 1969 and transferred custody of the hull to the Commander, Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay.

OPINIONS

EVENTS PRIOR TO COLLISION

Command and Control, and Tactical Documents

1. (U) There was no misunderstanding in screening ships as to the identity of the OTC of TG 472.1 or TU 472.1.0 at any time.

2. (U) Any misunderstanding between FOCAF and CO MELBOURNE as to the identity of the OTC of TG 472.1 or TU 472.1.0, which may have existed prior to 021530Z, was not a contributing cause of the collision.

3. (U) Although no publication effective for this exercise clearly so stipulated as a matter of doctrine, all ships in the MELBOURNE Task Group understood that the zigzagging so ordered was to be based upon zero hour 2300G, 2 June, or 0200, 3 June; both are correct.

4. (U) Ships in the same formation were using their knowledge of different documents as basic authority for zigzagging plans and doctrine. Hence, if they had attempted to use plans or doctrine from their respective basic authorities, dangerous confusion could have ensued.

5. (U) ATP 1(A) Volume I, as effective for the Exercise SEA SPIRIT (namely with changes 1 through 4), contained adequate doctrinal material to provide a common understanding for zigzagging except as to determination of zero hour in a multi-hour plan, which could be misconstrued if not signalled.

6. (U) The fact that some ships held ATP 3 and some held ATP 3(A) and that different basic authorities might have been applied by different ships did not in actuality contribute to the collision.

7. (U) If zigzagging is contemplated during an operation, the operation order should either contain all plans and doctrine necessary, or should specifically reference the document wherein such are contained and specifically exclude the use of other possibly applicable publications.

8. (U) For allied operations, a specific definition of "patrolling sectors" is required for ASW screening.

9. (U) Certain signals transmitted by CO MELBOURNE as CTU 472.1.0 were procedurally incorrect.

Example 1

"Form 1" was addressed to the Task Unit collectively (at 022010Z), although only MELBOURNE and EVANS were to act on the signal. A proper address for this signal would have been: action to MELBOURNE and EVANS, information to the Task Unit.

Example 2

Receipts for the "Turn R" (resume previous zigzag) signals at 021915Z and 021953Z were requested by the originator (CTU 472.1.0) only from MELBOURNE. This practice does not provide positive assurance that the signal was received by anyone outside the Flagship and can lead to dangerous consequences (which it did not in this instance). At least one additional station outside the ship should have been required to receipt to insure that the signal was emitted from the ship.

Status of Ships

10. (U) An open hatch in the main deck, and open doors at main deck level and above contributed to the intake of a large amount of water in the after section when EVANS rolled deeply to starboard at collision. This contributed to a marked free-surface effect and a dangerously marginal stability in the after section.

11. (U) The damage control and watertight integrity conditions in effect in EVANS were entirely reasonable under the circumstances.

Lights

12. (U) Ships in TU 472.1.0 had been following the motions of MELBOURNE's lighting measures as prescribed in the MOP and outlined in the Escort Handout.

13. (U) It appears that EVANS' navigation lights were not on during the early part of the maneuver, but this did not hinder CO MELBOURNE or the OOW from determining what her movements or aspects were during the period prior to collision.

14. (U) The presence of moonlighting on the flight deck of MELBOURNE did not obscure the navigation lights when they were turned on prior to the collision.

15. (U) The arrays of various lighting required for the conduct of flying operations in MELBOURNE can be confusing to an observer and require close attention by all concerned.

16. (U) The lights showing on MELBOURNE immediately prior to the collision, which confused LTJG , did not confuse LTJG

17. (U) The red light seen momentarily by LT at bridge level of EVANS after she completed her initial turn to starboard did not confuse LT

18. (U) The red light seen below EVANS' bridge on the starboard side came from a night standing light inside the superstructure shining through an open door on the 01 level or main deck.

19. (U) Characteristics and locations of the various lights installed in MELBOURNE used in the conduct of flying operations need further clarification in the Escort Handout.

20. (U) In order to determine, with some degree of accuracy, the characteristics of lights used incident to aircraft operations as viewed from outside MELBOURNE, a survey should be conducted and the results therefrom included in the Escort Handout.

21. (U) The OOW of an aircraft carrier should have authority to control the switching on or off of all lights visible to other ships.

"Form Column" Signal to Collision

22. (C) To accommodate flight operations in the face of a submarine threat, CO MELBOURNE as OTC occasionally found it desirable to approximate the zigzag plan by TURN and CORPEN signals while the zigzag was stopped. Execution of TURN and CORPEN signals between 0200G and 0300G took place as follows:

TIME(G)	SIGNAL	MEANING	PLAN 13S ZZ Course (Base Course 220)
0206	Turn X	Cease zigzag, resume base course	190
0207	CORP 140	My course 140	190
0214	Turn 220	Turn together, Right to 220	220
0215	Turn R	Resume previous zigzag	220
0246	CORP P 190	Guide steer course 190	199
0249	Turn 244	Turn together, Right to 244	244
0253	185 Turn	Turn together, Left to 185	185
0255	Turn R	Resume previous zigzag	185

Note that when the zigzag was resumed at 0215G, the effective zigzag course was the same as the base course

It is possible that LTJG observing the similarity of the pattern of signals 0253 - 0255 with those of 0214 - 0215, concluded - that when the zigzag was resumed at 0255 the effect was to change the base course to 185. No other explanation is available for his belief that the base course at 0310G was 185.

In any case, base course for the zigzag at 0310G was 220. This was well understood in the Task Group. LTJG was wrong in believing it to be 185.

23. (U) ENS nd ENS b oth deceased) were on watch in EVANS' CIC at time or collision. Both are described as officers of high calibre who were well qualified in their respective watch assignments. The Board is at a loss to understand why they apparently from the evidence available made no effort to assist EVANS' OOD and JOOD during the critical period between the "form column" signal and collision.

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24. (U) LTJG ___ _ and LTJG descriptions of their actions in response to the Form ONE signal display a casual approach in which:

a. They had differing views as to base course and guide's course at 0310G.

b. An initial radar range and bearing of MELBOURNE was taken by LTJG (084°-3,800 yards) of which the bearing was incorrect.

c. Thereafter they made no effort to measure the radar range to MELBOURNE, nor to plot the relative positions of the two ships, nor to track MELBOURNE.

d. LTJG de no visual check of MELBOURNE before taking action to proceed to his ordered position. Even a rough visual bearing would have alerted him to the true situation.

e. A maneuvering board solution was attempted by LTJG then abandoned in favor of seaman's eye.

f. LTJG ither initiated or concurred in the initial action taken by LTJG Hopson without making his own visual appreciation of the situation.

g. They neither requested information from CIC nor did they act on any advice which may have been passed from CIC.

h. LTJG led to call the Captain.

25. (U) LTJG Incorrect decoding of the Task Unit Commander's CORPEN signal announcing "My course is 260°" as an announcement of MELBOURNE's turning left to 160° was a major source of the confusion on EVANS' bridge. That she did not appear to turn left in accord with his stated expectation should have alerted him to the hazard of the situation.

26. (U) LTJG having ordered the helmsman to steady on 050° and observing MELBOURNE's bearing to have moved left, opposite to his expectation, took action in the correct direction, in the light of the actual facts as well as the facts as he believed them to be, in then applying left 5° rudder (reported by LTJG as 10°). A more decisive action at this time (more rudder) would have been required to clear MELBOURNE by an acceptable distance.

27. (U) LTJG oon hearing the CTU's signal, "You are on a collision course" assessed EVANS' position as being broad on MELBOURNE's port bow, whereas its position was then about 12° on MELBOURNE's port bow.

28. (U) EVANS was the burdened vessel both under paragraph 532 of ATP 1(A), Volume I (Change 4), and also under Rule 19 of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea which it displaced.

29. (U) Under both paragraph 532, ATP 1(A), Volume I, and the foregoing Regulations, which, except for Rule 19, did apply, it was the duty of MELBOURNE to maintain her course and speed and the duty of EVANS to keep clear. The best manner in which to keep clear involved an exercise of judgment.

30. (U) On LTJG ssessment of the situation, a turn to the right by EVANS was the correct action to take. In light of the true facts, it was not.

31. (U) From the moment EVANS heard MELBOURNE say, "I am coming hard left," it became increasingly unlikely that any action by EVANS could have averted collision. It is conceivable that immediate action at this point may have avoided collision. Easing or shifting the rudder, or reversing engines at this time, might have ruduced the collision angle and/or force of the impact.

32. (U) Captain had the conn of MELBOURNE from the moment EVANS turned toward MELBOURNE in response to the "Form column" signal and was solely responsible for MELBOURNE's movements from there on.

33. (U) From the moment CO MELBOURNE became aware of EVANS' signal, "My rudder is right full," an immediate reversal of rudder would not have averted the collision, but it would have altered the angle of impact by a small amount. An order to reverse engines at this stage would have made no difference whatsoever.

34. (U) CO MELBOURNE took several steps to attempt to assure that collision would be avoided, as detailed in his testimony (p. 102). These steps are indicative of a cautious man endeavoring to avoid a collision. Post-collision analysis indicated, however, that he might have done more as follows, although the Board stopped short of faulting his judgement in these matters:

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a. Stop the zigzag by signal prior to the "form column" signal instead of ordering "form column" within 2 or 3 minutes of a scheduled zigzag course change. Although not required by the zigzag doctrine in Figure 10-2 of ATP 1(A), Volume I (Change 4), this step may have been wise in the interest of safety.

b. Give the CORPEN signal at 0312G with numbers in plain language. This would have given the information more rapidly and with less possibility of misunderstanding.

c. Require a steady flow of ranges and possibly gyro bearings of EVANS, and thus continuous informed observations of the relative positions of the two ships, to obtain timely, accurate information on alterations in EVANS' course, from the "form column" signal onward, or at latest, as soon as a collision course situation was detected.

d. Order the PRITAC speaker to be turned up so he could hear it himself, when it became apparent that EVANS was on a collision course.

e. Either make the 0313 zigzag turn (20° left) on schedule, so announcing to EVANS on PRITAC, or announce his intention to withhold the turn, although the Board is not inclined to believe that either of these actions would have necessarily prevented the collision.

35. (U) LTJG . action in ordering "All engines back full" was commendable, but too late to affect the collision.

36. (U) LT action in ordering "Stop both engines" was commendable, but too late to affect the collision.

37. (U) Captain . s subsequent order "Full astern both engines" was also too late to affect the collision.

38. (U) CDR ... arrived on MELBOURNE's bridge just as the wheel orders "Port 30 - Port 35" were being executed. His testimony makes it clear that he played no part in any of the events prior to collision (R, p. 92, 186).

39. (U) Captain testimony indicating extensive collaboration between himself and CDR may relate to activities immediately following collision.

Signals

40. (U) The Board considers that in fast-moving or close quarter situations, the advantage of avoiding time delays and oral relays in communications between ships makes it advisable for conning officers to listen to PRITAC on a loudspeaker, and have the equipment capability to transmit personally on the circuit at will.

Miscellaneous

41. (U) The fact that EVANS was markedly out of her assigned sector at least once, probably twice, during the period 0230G-0310G, without notice by anyone in MELBOURNE or Screen Commander's flagship, is indicative of a remarkably low standard of station keeping in EVANS, and a less than vigilant watch by the OTC and Screen Commander on the operation of the Task Unit (R, p. 146).

42. (U) Latest tactical data available on each class of ship in USN and RAN should be examined for applicability to current ship configurations and so certified by cognizant authority, or re-established by new trials.

43. (U) As indicated by the testimony of LT nd by examination of the ship's records, EVANS' officer training program was well organized, planned and executed.

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POST COLLISION

Immediate Results and Actions

44. (U) FOCAF's decision to refrain from broadcasting a distress call on international distress frequencies was correct.

Escape from Forward Section of EVANS

45. (U) The forward section of EVANS, including equipment and personnel remains therein, is not recoverable or salvable.

46. (U) Recovery of the forward section of EVANS, and consequent compromise of classified material therein, by an unfriendly foreign power is unlikely.

47. (U) In those compartments of the forward section containing a number of men some of whom were survivors, direction by leaders contributed to the escape of survivors.

48. (U) In the forward section the extent and effectiveness of leadership were necessarily restricted by the circumstances, and no more could have been done than was done.

49. (U) The officers and men who had to climb, and in some cases swim, through compartments which were 90° from the normal, in darkness or semi-darkness, showed great resource and courage.

50. (U) It was obvious to all who exited the ship through the flooding compartments that the ship was in extremity.

51. (U) No one delayed his entry into the water for lack of a formal order to abandon ship.

52. (U) Both the CO, Commander and the Executive Officer, LCDR who were without means of general communications to their men, took sufficient and reasonable action to order anyone within hearing to get away before they entered the water to save themselves.

53. (U) If Seaman had not opened the weather door through which the men from First Division and Oil Division berthing compartments were escaping, they would have had difficulty in pushing it open from below and it is likely that fewer men would have been able to escape from the ship.

54. (U) The conduct of the officers and enlisted men in the forward section was exemplary. Courage, resource and concern for their fellow men characterized their actions. They were seamen who upheld, in every way open to them, the proud traditions of the sea and of the United States Navy.

Escape from After Section of EVANS

55. (U) The actions of the Senior Officer on the after section of EVANS, Lieutenant USN, in shouting orders to go to General Quarters, in taking charge on the fantail, in ordering a distribution of life jackets, and in the assembly and evacuation of casualties were prompt, effective and appropriate.

56. (U) LTJG USN, took immediate and appropriate action to secure the engineering plant, to assess the damage to the ship, to set damage control condition ZEBRA and to search interior compartments before closing down.

57. (U) LTJG reported his opinion that the stern section was in a critical condition to the Senior Officer onboard, LT , USN. LTJG 's report was based on a reasonable and justifiable assessment of the facts as known to him and taking into account the views of the Executive Officer of MELBOURNE, Commander

58. (U) LT 's order to evacuate the stern section was timely and appropriate and was taken only after a complete search had been made for survivors and that Condition ZEBRA was set.

58A. (U) The evacuation of the stern section was accomplished in a calm and orderly manner under the supervision of officers and senior enlisted men.

59. (U) Senior enlisted men acted on their own initiative to calm the men, clear and search the berthing compartments, and set Condition ZEBRA. For example, the performance of the following was creditable:

60. (U) There was a lack of direction to the men in the Forward Engineroom due to the injuries received at the time of the collision by the Top Watch, Chief

61. (U) In the circumstances, the lack of direction of the men in the Forward Engineroom was not a factor in delaying their escape, which was the only action then open to them and one which they instinctively performed.

62. (U) The junior watchkeepers in the Forward Engineroom displayed creditable concern for their fellows in showing each other the way and assisting each other out of the hatch. Fireman behavior in assisting Machinist's Mate to and through the hatch, before he left himself is particularly noteworthy.

63. (U) The devotion to duty of Seaman Apprentice in remaining at his post in After Steering until ordered to leave is noteworthy.

64. (U) The officers and enlisted men in the after section responded promptly to the orders of the senior officer and behaved at all times with due order and alacrity.

65. (U) The behavior of the officers and enlisted men onboard the after section was exemplary. They faced a frightening catastrophe calmly and, without exception, set about their duty in an orderly and purposeful manner. Appropriate leadership was displayed by all of whom it could be expected. They were a credit to their ship and to the U. S. Navy.

MELBOURNE Search and Rescue Operations

66. (U) The immediate orders of the Captain at or about the moment of impact were the correct orders to give in that they initiated rescue operations in the quickest way possible, and alerted personnel to the urgency of the situation.

67. (U) The search measures adopted by OCAP in the conditions of calm sea and visibility prevailing ensured that no survivor in the water was overlooked.

68. (U) The rapid availability of MELBOURNE's No. 2 Motor Cutter was a significant factor in the success of the rescue operations, in that it picked up about 29 men within fifteen minutes.

69. (U) Had MELBOURNE's utility boat been serviceable, rescue operations might have been accelerated.

70. (U) Prompt actions such as releasing lifesaving equipment and recalling airborne helicopters were important factors contributing to the success of rescue operations.

71. (U) Swimmers in the water from MELBOURNE, some acting on their own initiative, were able to contribute to the success of the rescue operations.

72. (U) Helicopters from MELBOURNE and KEARSARGE played an important part in the night search operations by providing illumination.

73. (U) When survivors were concentrated in a small area at night it would have been dangerous if there had been more than 2 helicopters operating in that area.

74. (U) Adequate medical personnel and facilities were available and utilized.

75. (U) The initiative displayed by officers and senior sailors in MELBOURNE in helping to move men from the after section of EVANS to the MELBOURNE was commendable.

Reboarding and Salvage

76. (U) The salvage actions taken by the Engineer Officer EVANS, LTJG and the Engineer Officer LT were timely and appropriate to the circumstances. They stopped the major flooding in the stern section of EVANS and contributed significantly to the eventual salvage of the stern section.

77. (U) Effective and timely steps were taken by EVANS' personnel to recover and safeguard essential records, classified, accountable and pilferable material from the after section of EVANS.

78. (U) The commands concerned with formulation and dissemination of abandon ship instructions should review such instructions insofar as they relate to the duties of accountable officers, with the object of insuring their adequacy and thorough promulgation.

Emergency Lighting in EVANS

79. (U) Non-availability of emergency power in the after section of EVANS following the collision was the result of either: effects of the impact of collision on the circuit breakers or other features of the after emergency switchboard, or on power circuits connected thereto, or to improper setting on that switchboard.

80. (U) The installation of a greater number of relay actuated emergency battle lanterns would have facilitated the orientation and egress of personnel in the rapidly flooding forward section of EVANS' hull, and in the forward engineroom.

81. (U) The number and placement of relay actuated emergency battle lanterns in the after portion of EVANS (less the forward engineroom) were not determining factors in the safe egress of personnel.

82. (U) In general, those relay actuated emergency battle lanterns not in the vicinity of the collision point functioned as designed.

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83. (U) Removal of a battle lantern from its mounting in the after portion of EVANS, reported by one crew member, did not impede orientation and egress of personnel.

84. (U) The various commands concerned with design, procurement, distribution and installation of ships' emergency lighting systems should review specifications and installation plans to ensure that adequate provision is made for automatic emergency lighting in crew's compartments and egress routes, as well as battle stations. This review should take account of evidence that USN specifications may not be clear and that individual USN ships have at present wide latitude in determining the number, types and locations of emergency lights.

Life Rafts

85. (U) There was on board EVANS an adequate number of rafts in serviceable condition.

86. (U) Five rafts mounted on the port side of EVANS' bridge were destroyed or severely damaged in the collision so as not to be completely serviceable.

87. (U) Two rafts found on the main deck port side forward during salvage operations came from the EVANS' bridge stowage.

88. (U) Three or four U.S. rafts seen astern of MELBOURNE after the collision were those released by LTJG prior to boarding MELBOURNE.

Life Jackets

89. (U) Unless large reserve supplies of life jackets are provided, which would cause major stowage problems on most warships, no known system of life jacket distribution suitable for extended use in peacetime could avoid a maldistribution of life jackets in a catastrophe such as this, in which EVANS was cut in half during the night without warning.

90. (U) The practice of stowing life jackets at or in the vicinity of General Quarters stations, with upper deck stowage of those for special use and reserve supply, is sound and should be continued.

Deaths and Injuries

91. (U) In the absence of further evidence and of a full autopsy report, it is not possible to say whether the death by drowning of SA Glines was contributed to by his being entangled in the cord of his headset, or by difficulty in keeping himself above water due to his injuries, or to a combination of these factors.

92. (U) The injuries to the following personnel were received in the line of duty and not as a result of their own misconduct:

Miscellaneous (Post-Collision)

93. (U) Studies are required to redesign sound powered telephone headsets and cords to prevent the impediment underfoot caused by lengths of cord lying on deck unneeded at a given moment.

94. (U) The collision revealed no significant deficiencies in EVANS with respect to the ship's design or outfitting.

95. (U) The design, outfitting and functioning of the equipment of EVANS in no way contributed to the collision.

96. (U) Steam burns suffered by personnel in EVANS' forward engineroom would not have been prevented if they had been required to wear long-sleeved shirts, or special clothing of any practical kind known to the board.

Reconstruction

97. (U) A reconstruction based on the board's analysis is attached. The notes thereon are an integral part of the opinion.

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98. (U) The following table displays the Board's best estimates of hypothetical alternative final turns by each ship based on reconstruction..



Note: 1. 0 - miss; x - hit; close - 100 yards or less.

2. Actions referred to are alternatives to be considered in lieu of and at the respective times of EVANS' "Right Full Rudder" and MELBOURNE's "Port 30 - Port 35"

3. Engine orders are a separate subject.

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Responsibility for Collision

99. (U) Inasmuch as EVANS had the duty to remain clear of MELBOURNE in taking station in column astern of her, and she did not do so, primary responsibility for the collision rests upon EVANS.

100. (U) As the Conning Officer of EVANS from the time of execution of the "form column" signal until the order "right full rudder," LTJG as responsible for the orders which placed EVANS on a collision course with MELBOURNE. His subsequent action in ordering a left turn was sufficient to relieve but not to eliminate the hazard in which he had placed both ships. His failure in the following respects were failures to exercise due care which contributed to the collision:

a. His failure to ascertain correctly the base course of the formation before turning.

b. His failure to ascertain correctly EVANS' position relative to MELBOURNE before turning.

c. His failure to ascertain correctly MELBOURNE's course before turning.

d. His failure to request information from the Combat Information Center.

e. His failure to keep track of MELBOURNE's movements relative to EVANS from the time the maneuver began either visually or by radar or preferably by a combination of both methods, which would have revealed to him among other things, that he was on a collision course.

f. His failure to make a more decisive turn to the left which would have eliminated all hazard to both ships.

101. (U) As the Officer of the Deck, LTJG was personally responsible for the conning actions taken by LTJG to whom he had delegated conning authority and is equally responsible for conning EVANS into a collision course with MELBOURNE and the subsequent left turn.

102. (U) By the order, "Right full rudder," LTJG assumed the sole responsibility for the conning of EVANS.

103. (U) As Officer of the Deck, LTJG was the officer on watch in charge of the ship, and his primary responsibility was the safe navigation of that ship. Therefore, the basic responsibility for the collision flows from the manner in which LTJG discharged his duties as Officer of the Deck aboard EVANS during the midwatch on the morning of 3 June 1969.

His failures either to take or direct action in the following respects were failures to exercise due care which contributed to the collision:

a. His failure to ensure that the conning officer knew the base course of the formation before turning.

b. His failure to ascertain correctly EVANS' position relative to MELBOURNE before turning.

c. His failure to ensure that the conning officer knew MELBOURNE's course before turning.

d. His failure to request information from the Combat Information Center.

e. His failure to keep track of MELBOURNE's movements relative to EVANS from the time the maneuver began either visually or by radar or preferably by a combination of both methods, which would have revealed to him among other things, that he was on a collision course.

f. His failure to make a more decisive turn to the left which would have eliminated all hazard to both ships.

g. His failure to call CO EVANS as he was required to do.

h. His failure to decode MELBOURNE's CORPEN signal correctly.

104. (U) As CO EVANS, CDR had the responsibility to insure that adequate provision was made for the safe navigation of his ship under all foreseeable conditions. This included responsibility to insure:

a. That a qualified and trained watch was posted.

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b. That adequate instructions, including standing and current night orders, were provided to meet all foreseeable contingencies.

c. That adequate instructions, including standing and current night orders, were provided as to calling him during the night to advise, among other things, of signals for EVANS to change station within the formation.

d. That adequate measures were taken to insure that his orders and instructions in these respects were carried out.

105. (U) CO EVANS adequately discharged these responsibilities.

106. (U) Although the Board finds no acts or omissions of CO EVANS which contributed to the collision, it recognizes the inherent accountability of a Commanding Officer for his ship, and his absolute responsibility for the actions of his ship.

107. (U) Captain must bear a share of responsibility for the collision since as Task Unit Commander, he was responsible for the safe operation of all ships in the Task Unit. He failed to exercise due care in that he did not positvely direct the movements of EVANS at a time not later than when EVANS was determined by him to have come into a collision course. It is considered that the informatory signal sent at that time, that EVANS was on a collision course, was in the circumstances not positive enough.

108. (U) Although it is doubtful that MELBOURNE's speed would have been appreciably reduced before collision, Captain as Commanding Officer MELBOURNE should have backed his engines at the time he put his rudder over. Such an action, though not avoiding collision, might have lessened the effects thereof.

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338. (U) Two uninflated rafts with broken static lines were found port side forward main deck of EVANS during salvage operations (R, p. 501).

339. (U) LTJG assisted by Gunner's Mate Second Class launched 3 - 4 life rafts from starboard side racks and inflated 2. They left the others uninflated in their valises when ordered to board MELBOURNE (R, p. 529).

340. (U) In the general area of the bow section there were about 4 U.S. rafts and 4 Australian rafts seen to be functioning properly (R, p. 429, 430).

Life Jackets

341. (U) According to an inventory of life jackets conducted in February 1969 EVANS had on board a total of 315 life jackets of the following types:

70 Kapok

245 Yoke type CO_2 inflatable

This equates to 115% of personnel on board the EVANS (R, p. 493).

342. (U) EVANS' inflatable life jackets were distributed in the vicinity of General Quarters stations. Kapok life jackets were distributed in the vicinity of line working stations for underway replenishment and in the ship's motor whaleboat (R, p. 493; Exhibit 84).

343. (U) Personnel whose General Quarters stations were on the bridge or in exposed areas also used Kapok jackets (R, p. 493).

344. (U) EVANS checked that all hands had life jackets each time the crew exercised at General Quarters. Any maldistributions were immediately corrected. No inadequacies in the number available had ever been reported (R, p. 493).

345. (U) Life jackets had been available to all hands (273 people) at abandon ship drills (R, p. 490).

346. (U) The total number of personnel in the after section of the ship at the time of collision was 162, of whom 139 were asleep or in their quarters and 23 were on watch or working (Exhibit 84).

347. (U) There were 95 General Quarters stations in the section of EVANS which remained afloat. All General Quarters stations in the after part of the ship had inflatable life jackets at those stations (Exhibit 84).

348. (U) The approximate total number of life jackets available in the after part of the EVANS was 140 of which 92 were of the inflatable type and 48 were Kapok type (R, p. 494; Exhibit 84).

349. (U) In the forward section of EVANS, there is no evidence that anyone attempted to obtain life jackets prior to making his escape from the ship even though at least one person (XO EVANS) had two life jackets in the immediate vicinity of his bunk (R, p. 547, numerous witnesses).

Deaths and Injuries

350. (U) As a result of the collision, Seaman Apprentice , USN, was drowned. His body was recovered and returned to KEARSARGE from MELBOURNE. The body was identified by dental records (Exhibits 34, 102).

351. (U) SA body was thereafter transferred to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, RVN, for preparation and shipment to CONUS (Exhibit 102).

352. (U) Although the Senior Medical Officer, KEARSARGE, had intended that an autopsy should be performed on SA GLINES, no request was made to Tan Son Nhut Air Base to this effect and no autopsy was performed (Exhibit 102).

353. (U) As a result of the collision, the following named naval personnel were lost at sea, their deaths being attributed to traumatic injuries or drowning and their bodies not being recovered:

354. (U) Death reports on all the personnel listed in Findings of Facts 350 and 353 have been submitted on NAVJAG Form 5800/16 (Exhibit 34).

355. (U) As a result of the collision, the following named EVANS personnel suffered injuries which resulted in their inability to perform duty for a period exceeding 24 hours:

B6
B6
B6
B6
B6
B6

(Exhibits 33, 35, 82, 83; R, p. 398, 402, 405, 572)

356. (U) There were no personnel casualties in MELBOURNE as a result of the collision (Exhibit 47).





















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